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Abstract
Insider trading and earnings management (EM) have traditionally been associated with
fraud and corporate scandals. Corporations involved in fraudulent financial reporting or
earnings manipulations were assumed to have used insider trading patterns to manipulate
earnings, thereby concealing information from investors. The purpose of this quantitative,
non-experimental study was to examine the association between insider trading patterns
and EM citations among a randomly selected sample of publicly traded companies. The
research question pertained to the association between the number of EM citations and
whether a firm exhibited patterns of insider trading among publicly traded firms. The
theoretical framework was based on accounting, auditing and financial theories. Archival
data were collected in the form of financial statements from annual reports of 77
companies submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission. A multiple linear
regression was used to answer the research question to determine whether there was an
association between insider trading patterns and EM. Results of descriptive statistics and
regression analysis revealed that, after controlling for the firm size, a significant
association existed between the number of EM citations and patterns of insider trading in
the sample of publicly traded firms. A positive relationship, wherein firms with patterns
of insider trading had more EM citations as indicated from the regression results. These
findings may encourage investors, regulators, auditors, the public, and other interested
parties to work with researchers to foster confidence in financial markets and the
accounting profession, and to redeem the mistakes made by companies in the past.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
The corporate accounting scandals that occurred in the early 2000s brought down
leading firms like Enron, HealthSouth, Tyco, and WorldCom and caused a lack of faith
of investors to make decisions on how to invest their funds. It was also indicated that
different financial and accounting issues followed these notable scandals such as
bankruptcy filings, which brought financial-reporting practice under scrutiny. The
resulting concerns from investors regarding financial issues is a commonly referenced
course of collapse or decline in the securities market. This follows as financial
misconduct and is associated with large stock price decline, SEC inquiry, top executive
change or turnover, insider trading, and bankruptcy filings (Agrawal & Cooper, 2015).
Therefore, in 2002, the U.S. Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act in response
to the financial crisis in financial reporting. The focus of the SOX Act is to improve the
quality of financial reporting, improve corporate social responsibility, invoke corporate
governance, and to restore investor confidence in decisions regarding how they diversify
their funds when investing.
Earnings management (EM) is a recognized key to measuring corporate
performance. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) permits managers
certain accounting discretions when completing financial reports. Thus, corporate
executives have taken advantage of this leverage to manage earnings aggressively either
by accrual accounting or real accounting, such as cost allocation, transfer pricing, or
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capital budgeting in preparing financial reports at the discretion of management (Christie
& Zimmerman, 1994). Prior research has shown that the motives behind these practices
often include strengthening the quality of financial reporting based on information
asymmetry or linking it to insider trading customs or practices (Agrawal & Cooper, 2015;
Ahearne, Boichuk, Chapman, & Steenburgh, 2016; Alldredge & Cicero, 2015; Godsell,
Welker, & Zhang, 2017; Goel & Goel, 2017; Olsen & Zaman, 2013; Sawicki & Shrestha,
2014; Tartaroglu & Imhof, 2017).
When it comes to EM, information is important and the method used to
disseminate information is crucial to the investor. This also requires paying more
attention to the stock market, which can lead to better decision-making among investors.
Corporate insider trades predict abnormal future returns based on inside information,
which corporate insiders are privy to before the public, thereby disregarding the legal
prohibitions on using inside information to make trading decisions. If stock prices reflect
all publicly available information, some profitable inside stock selling could also be
related to public information (Alldredge & Cicero, 2014). Because EM can be used with
insider trading, it is important to examine the association between the two. Therefore, I
conducted this study to examine whether there is an association between insider trading
patterns and EM citations for a randomly selected sample of publicly traded companies.
Background of the Study
Fraudulent financial reporting and corporate fraud have been linked to a lack of
proper corporate governance (Hossain, Mitra, Rezaee, & Sarath, 2011). EM,
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compensation structures for managers, and stock option backdating practices have also
contributed to the problem, which is tied to the influence of board members and audit
committees (Hossain et al., 2011). EM has been frequently been included in accounting
literature (Sawicki & Shrestha, 2014); however, a limited number of researchers have
examined the incentives associated with EM regarding insider trading patterns. But there
is a significant connection between insider trading patterns and EM (Beneish & Vargus,
2002). For example, Sawicki and Shrestha (2014) documented the opportunistic EM
patterns attributed, in part, to incentives associated with insider trading. Comparatively,
Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) concluded that managers cash out after disclosing robust
earnings news. Because of previous researchers’ findings on EM, in this study I
examined the influence that insider trading has on EM.
Corporations manage their earnings in ways that lead to misrepresentation in the
firms’ financial reports, which can lead to submitting fraudulent financial reports (and
subsequently corporate fraud) based on fabrication of earnings through either accrual
management, real activities management, or buyback of stock options (Gunny, 2010).
This led to the passage of the SOX Act of 2002, though some have argued that
corporations face challenges with the law with respect to the cost involved in compliance,
particularly with SOX 404, which regards internal control (Shaw & Terando, 2014). On
the contrary, empirical evidence has shown that since the SOX Act was enacted, auditors
have discounted their initial year audit fees, which was the practice before the SOX Act
(Desir, Casterella, & Kokina, 2014). Disclosure of financial reports and the reaction from
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the market with respect to public earnings announcements have dominated the research in
accounting economics and finance (Sawicki & Shrestha, 2014). Many studies show the
importance of disclosure, especially in regard to timing and quality of financial
information, and EM is at the center of this problem (Sawicki & Shrestha, 2014). Prior
research shows various incentives for EM, including those that arise from management
ownership, as well as an establishment of an implicit link between insider selling and
income-increasing EM (Sawicki & Shrestha, 2014). However, there is a lack of empirical
studies on the effect of the SOX Act on the prevention of insider trading as it relates to
EM.
Some studies have addressed motives that drive managerial equity ownership
while creating the avenue for EM (Ali, 2017; Dargenidou, Tonks, & Tsoligkas, 2017;
Gao, Gao, & Wang, 2017; Janney & Gove, 2017; Li, Nekrasov, & Teoh, 2017). For
example, Chen, Lee, and Chou (2015) noted the link to future management selling based
on optimization of equity-based compensation using different methods to integrate firms’
unmanaged performance, discretionary accounting choices, and consensus earnings
forecasts, which can create a motivation to manage earnings. These prior research studies
have addressed these questions on an individual basis (Agrawal & Cooper, 2015).
However, researchers had yet to be conducted on the relationship between insider trading
patterns as they relate to corporate performance and EM.
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Problem Statement
Corporate accounting scandals have affected companies such as Enron and
WorldCom, which put financial-reporting practices under scrutiny. In these scandals,
Enron had a net loss of $618 million, and WorldCom disguised a loss of $662 million as
a profit of $2.4 billion (Brickey, 2003). This general problem of fraud in corporate
accounting manifesting as excessive EM has become more widespread (Lin & Wu,
2015). The specific problem was that the association between insider trading patterns and
EM citations among publicly traded companies was not well understood.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this quantitative, non-experimental study was to examine the
association between insider trading patterns and EM citations for a randomly selected
sample of publicly traded companies. I analyzed insider trading patterns and EM through
accrual-based and real activities EM with year-end financial reports, stock options,
proxies, and other filings of selected companies. I used these data sources to determine
what association exists between insider trading patterns and EM citation between 2002
and 2012.
Through this quantitative research study, I examined insider trading patterns and
EM citations after the SOX Act of 2002 until 2012. The categorical independent variable
was insider trading patterns. The continuous dependent variable was number of EM
citations. I included firm size as a covariate. I focused on a sample of randomly selected
publicly trading companies listed in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and used
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archival data from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Compustat,
Institutional Brokers Estimates System, CDA Spectrum database, Execucomp database,
and the NYSE.
Research Question and Hypotheses
Research Question 1: What association exists between number of earnings
management citations and patterns of insider trading in publicly trading firms, controlling
for firm size?
H0: There is no significant association between number of earnings management
citation and patterns of insider trading in the publicly trading firms after controlling for
firm size.
Ha: There is a significant association between number of earnings management
citation and patterns of insider trading in the publicly traded firms after controlling for
firm size.
I used a quantitative, non-experimental correlational study approach to answer the
research question. Archival data comprised the continuous variable of number of EM
citations, the categorical variable of patterns of insider trading, and the categorical
variable of firm size. I performed a multiple linear regression to evaluate the association
between the study variables, using the following regression equation:
𝑦𝑦 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏1 𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑏𝑏2 𝑥𝑥2 + 𝑒𝑒

Where y = the dependent variable of number of earning management citations, a = the
intercept, x1 = the independent variable of insider trading patterns, x2 = the covariate of
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firm size, b1 = the regression coefficient estimate for x1, b2 = the regression coefficient
estimate for x2, and e = the error term. This research question was designed to address the
problems of financial crisis and fraudulent financial reporting that led to the SOX Act of
2002. The findings of this study may help change, create, or revise reporting
requirements for organizations.
Theoretical Foundation
The theoretical framework for this study was based on the accounting and
auditing theories of Arens, Elder, and Beasley (2014), Glover, Messier, and Prawitt
(2014), Fruhan (1979), and Haugen (2001), as well as financial theories of portfolio
performance. These theories address the nature of EM, corporate finance, risks and
returns investments, cost of capital, auditing, and assurance services with respect to
firms’ management of their earnings through investments and fees charged during audit
engagements. These theories also address the nature of how investors value investment
portfolios and the governance needed to sustain the firm. Finally, the authors of the
theories have commented on EM, financial reporting, corporate fraud, auditing standards,
audit fees, auditor independence, audit representation, audit committee, Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, corporate governance, and SOX; therefore, these theories
were applicable to the topic under study.
In addition to the various auditing theories, Gunny’s (2010) research on wealth
creation, financial risk, securities valuation, and financial decision processes provided a
foundation for the understanding of EM and the expectation of the management within
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these firms regarding risky or potentially harmful investments. This method could also
facilitate implementing financial strategies that would provide diversification of
portfolios, corporate governance, risk management and assessment, and how to curtail
any misrepresentation on the part of the audit firm and the firm it is representing.
Finally, I built on past research studies that have been conducted to investigate
what was previously common practice before the enactment of the SOX Act in 2002
(Hossain et al., 2011). After Congress passed the law, it changed the way companies did
business and how they managed the firm’s earnings. My study also built on past research
on corporate fraud and its effects after the SOX Act (2000-2012) on publicly traded
companies to determine whether there is an effect on insider trading patterns to boost
EM. In this study, I considered the nature of EM, insider trading, corporate governance,
corporate social responsibility, audit fees, auditor independence, financial reporting, and
how the public as well as investors value the information that they get. This framework
was supplemented using research by Carter (2013), Chen and Huang (2013), and Desir et
al. (2014). The study consisted of an examination of areas of EM, corporate fraud,
corporate governance, SOX, audit fees, auditor independence, audit committee, corporate
social responsibility audit policies, and financial reporting and accounting scandals from
2000-2012.
Nature of the Study
I followed a quantitative methodology with a non-experimental, correlational
design to evaluate the association between EM citations and insider trading patterns from
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2002-2012 in a randomly selected sample of publicly trading companies listed in the
NYSE. In this approach, researchers use numerically measurable variables to make
statistically backed inferences about a population or a relationship (Field, 2013). This was
an appropriate approach, as I sought to use archival data rather than interpret narratives
gained through an in-depth qualitative interview process (see Almalki, 2016). As I sought
to assess an existing relationship without the manipulation of any variables, the nonexperimental, correlational design was also appropriate (see Field, 2013). The variables
of interest in this study were the continuous variable of number of EM citations and the
categorical variable of insider trading patterns. A covariate of firm size was added to the
model. These variables were composed of archival data obtained from SEC, Compustat,
Institutional Brokers Estimates System CDA Spectrum database, Execucomp database,
and the NYSE. I evaluated the association between EM citation and insider trading
patterns from (2002-2012) in a randomly selected sample of publicly trading companies
listed in the NYSE using a multiple linear regression.
Definitions
EM can be considered beneficial to investors or executives. From a stock-based
compensation incentive, which can also be linked to insider trading patterns, given the
amount of risk inherent with stock-based compensation motives, management of earnings
is driven by managers with the sole purpose of obtaining some personal gain at the
detriment of shareholders (Schipper, 1989). Thus, the relationship between stock-based
compensation motives and EM becomes a significant problem for modern corporate
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governance. Schipper (1989) was the first person to add real earnings management
(REM) in the meaning of EM, defining it as a resolute behavior or intervention in the
external reporting process with the goal of personal profit, which also involves accrualsbased earnings management (AEM) and REM, achieved by investment timing or
financing decision that can alter earnings reported or a subset of it.
Definitions of Terms
Accruals Earnings Management (AEM): In the realm of GAAP choices that try to
“obscure” or “mask” the true economic performance of a firm (Dechow & Skinner,
2000).
Compensation structure: A process that provides a corporation the framework for
organizing and managing employees’ base salaries. A salary range in the pay structure
typically encompasses a grouping of jobs (e.g., position in the firm, jobs with similar job
responsibilities and levels, employee skill sets and strategic importance to the
organization). The pay levels associated with the salary ranges (i.e., minimum, midpoint
and maximums) are developed based upon the organization’s overall compensation
strategy and pay positioning (Bhat & Sveinsdottir, 2016; Devers & Sanders, 2016;
Humphery-Jenner, Lisic, Nanda, & Silveri, 2016; Pham, 2017; Woo, 2017).
Corporate governance: The way a firm manages and observes proper
answerability for managerial and financial performance (Rezaee, 2004).
Corporate social responsibility: The commitment that the management of
organization makes to improve the activities of the firm that have implications for
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economic, societal, and environmental concerns on multiple geographic levels (Harjoto &
Jo, 2015).
Earnings announcements: An official public statement of a corporation’s
profitability for a specific time, typically a quarter or a year. An earnings announcement
occurs on a specific date during earnings season and is preceded by earnings estimates
issued by equity analysts. When the company has been profitable leading up to the
announcement, their share price will usually increase after the information is released
(Chung, Kim, Lim, & Yang, 2016; Li, Nekrasov, & Teoh, 2017; Savor & Wilson, 2016).
Earnings management (EM): A process that happens when managers make
decisions on their own with respect to what financial numbers to include on the firm’s
financial reports to manage or influence the corporation’s financial performance (Watts
& Zimmerman, 1990). In this study, I measured EM by the number of quarters ranging
from 2002-2012.
Fraudulent financial reporting: When a firm is being “creative” or “cooking the
books” or even padding financial information (Kotsiantis et al., 2006), intentionally
misstating financial statements or disclosure in a material way as well as the perpetration
of an illegal act that has a direct effect on the financial statements or disclosures (Beasley
et al., 1999). Fraudulent accounting involves accounting choices that violate GAAP.
Information asymmetry: The failure of a transaction by two parties not displaying
or making know the same relevant information (Chae, 2005).
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Insider trading: Perceived as illegal and generally refers to the purchase or
trading a security in violation of a fiduciary duty or other association of trust and
credence while in control of material and nonpublic information about the security.
Insider trading breach can also include “tipping” such information, securities trading by
the person “tipped,” and securities trading by those who misuse such information. I
measured insider trading by the number of citations received by corporations engaged in
insider trading for the period of consideration 2002-2012.
The SEC defines insider trading as a term that most investors have heard and
usually associate with illegal conduct. However, the term includes both legal and illegal
conduct depending on the context. Insider trading that is perceived to be legal is a process
where the corporation’s insiders such as managers, officers, directors, and employees,
purchase and trade stock in their own firms. The rule of thumb is that when company
insiders do trade in their own stocks or securities, they must communicate or reveal their
dealings to the SEC.
Managerial incentives: A process where executive managers can select the type
of project that their firm can undertake. The argument surrounding this is that the
executive manager has the incentive to select investment projects that will reduce the
variability of the firm’s earnings stream, ceteris paribus. This can be due to the
overinvestment of a manager’s human capital in a single firm as well as the consequence
of under diversification of a manager’s personal wealth portfolio (Aboody, Levi, &
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Weiss, 2017; Akbulut Merchant, Jansen, & van Lier, 2016; Chesney, Stromberg, &
Wagner, 2016).
Performance-based compensation: An incentive-based form of compensation
reserved for hedge fund executive managers or elite portfolio managers. The basis of this
compensation is a percentage of total assets managed. This will be paid out if the
portfolio manager is able to deliver returns that are above a pre-specified level such as
performance in relation to the S&P 500 (Bennett, Bettis, Gopalan, & Milbourn, 2017;
Bettis, Bizjak, Coles, & Kalpathy, 2016; Chen, Chung, Peters, & Wynn, 2016; Devers &
Sanders, 2016; Woo, 2017).
Real Earnings Management (REM): Happens when managers undertake actions
or make decisions that deviate from best practices in other to increase the amount of
earnings reported.
Stock-based compensation: Directly related to stock price and ﬁrm performance,
bringing compensation risk to executives due to uncertainty of future wealth (Nagata &
Hachiya, 2007).
Stock option compensation: A way that corporations use stock options to reward
employees, though this is mostly restricted to executives. It is important that employees
with stock options know whether their stock is vested and will be able to retain its full
value even if they are no longer employed with that company. This is because the tax
consequences of the stock options depend on the fair market value of the stock. If the
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stock is subject to tax withholding, the tax must be paid in cash, even if the employee was
paid by equity compensation (Carberry & Zajac, 2017; Devers & Sanders, 2016).
Stock option backdating: The process where firms grant an option using a date
prior to the date that the company granted that option. Doing it this way allows the
exercise price of the granted option to be set at a lower price than that of the company’s
stock at the granting date. This process makes the granted option in-the-money and of
value to the holder (Dechow & Tan, 2016; Janney & Gove, 2017).
Trading profits: The amount of profit that an investor can derive from buying and
selling short-term securities, or those that the investor holds for less than 1 year. Trading
profits can be substantial if the investor knows what he or she is doing, but there is risk
involved. Governments often seek to encourage long-term investment at the expense of
short-term, and because of this, taxing of trading profit occurs at the higher income tax
rates instead of the capital gains rate (Hirshleifer & Usman, 2016; Van Vliet, 2017a,
2017b).
Assumptions
Due to the occurrence of fraudulent activities conducted within well-known and
highly publicized corporations, such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco, I assumed that
corporate insider trading and EM is present in most companies in some form.
Additionally, I assumed that the archival data was accurate and valid. As such, I also
assumed that the companies analyzed were accurately reported as having engaged in
fraudulent activities or not.
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Scope and Delimitations
In this study, I examined insider trading patterns and EM with respect to AEM
and REM after the SOX Act of 2002 and up to 2012. I focused on a sample of randomly
selected publicly trading companies listed in the NYSE. I did not examine the reasons
why individual investors made certain stock purchasing decisions based on the
information they have at their disposal. I used archival data that I obtained from the SEC,
Compustat, Institutional Brokers Estimates System, CDA Spectrum database,
Execucomp database, and the NYSE.
Limitations
I centered the present study on publicly quoted companies that report their
earnings to the SEC. These companies offer different types of services to the public,
which may be under the purview of separate parts of the company. As such, it is
conceivable that insider trading and EM could be associated with different portions of the
firm depending on what occurs with planning and forecasting.
An additional limitation lies in the nature of archival data. As I did not collect the
data, there is little information regarding potential sources of errors, bias, or internal and
external validity of the data. Additionally, EM or stock changes may be a result of events
from within the industry and not tied to insider trading or earnings manipulation due to
fraud or financial misstatement. However, the existing literature on earnings
announcements as well as other changes in stock returns provided viable reason to
investigate this issue (deHaan, Shevlin, & Thornock, 2015).
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Significance of the Study
EM is a part of a corporation (Chen et al., 2015), and the methods used are
important to this study. It is also a social issue because manipulations of earnings through
insider trading, either through AEM or REM, can affect society such as creating
uncertainty in the economy that can affect workers, individuals, and investors who will
lose funds they have invested. Therefore, I aimed to add to the current literature based on
the issues or problems created by EM manipulations through things such as buy backs,
stock options, executive incentives, stock based compensation, as well as make
recommendations that may improve the efficiency of SOX compliance and corporate
governance. I also aimed to build on findings reported by Chen and Huang (2013) with
additional relevant effects with similar samples. Corporations can predict material
weakness through audit reports in EM through better forecasting and proper vetting of
investments to access the risk involved as an effective short-term solution to the problem.
A gap existed in the literature regarding insider trading as it relates to EM,
because corporations manage their earnings through a variety of methods such as AEM
and REM. Firms mostly use AEM, as it allows them to boost performance (Cohen, Dey,
& Lys, 2008). But firms are now using REM after the SOX Act because of the additional
scrutiny imposed by the act to enhance firms’ performances in the eyes of investors
(Chen et al., 2015). Carrying out business in this form could lead to falsification of
financial reporting that can lead to negative economic cost to the firm, investors, and the
public. This study is significant, as it may provide insights into the stream of occurrences
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featured by the financial scandals that led to the enactment of the SOX Act in 2002.
Through this research, I aimed to increase awareness of the impacts that equity-based
compensation offers on broad managerial strategies that are affiliated to using optional or
elective accruals in concurrence with insider trading contingent on firm performance.
Significance to Theory
Information is key to the success of businesses; however, it is important how
firms disseminate information to the appropriate channels. There may be a link between
insider trading and earnings manipulation, which may lead to anomalies in stock market
inefficiencies because the information to the earnings announcement is limited. For
example, there may be a connection between insider trading and EM when it comes to the
dissemination of asymmetric information (Agarwal & Singh, 2006). This study can
support previous theory on insider trading and auditing by providing information on the
association between insider trading and EM.
Researchers such as Crouch (1970), Clarke (1973), Morgan (1976), and
Westerfield (1977) found an undeviating relationship between trading volume as well as
price that is stable with the day-to-day capacity for both market listing as well as
independent movement of share price. Grammatikos and Saunders (1986) provided
further evidence that volume is stable with price variability. Rutledge (1970-1980) also
supported a steady relationship between day-to-day volume and the absolute price
changes for 113 out of a total of 136 future contracts. This research relates to insider
trading based on the amount of information released to investors or kept for personal
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gain. As such, the study adds to the theory by providing an understanding of how trading
volume and price may have led to the actions that resulted in the passage of the SOX Act.
By using Gunny’s (2010) on the wealth creation, financial risk, securities
valuation, and financial decision processes as a foundation for the understanding of EM
as well as the expectations regarding the management of these firms when it comes to
taking on risky investments, this study can expand understanding on EM in relation to
insider trading. Using this method could also facilitate implementing financial strategies
that will provide diversification of portfolios, corporate governance, risk management
and assessment, and how to curtail any misrepresentation on the part of the audit firm and
the firm it is representing.
Significance to Practice
EM is one way that corporations measure their performance through a variety of
ways either through AEM, REM or through proper earnings forecast. However, insider
trading aligns with EM in a negative way that is not advantageous to investors, as they
have limited information to base their investing decisions on. If the earnings
announcements within the publicly traded firms increases the value of the firm or the
performance of the firm and trigger stock price changes due to available information,
then the opportunity may exist to use these announcements to drive investor confidence
in the stock pricing and returns on investments. Management decisions to make
information available to investors in a timely manner without hiding some of the
information will drive up the value of the firm holding every other thing constant. These
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decisions sometimes may either negatively (presence of insider trading) or positively
(absence of insider trading) propel investors into stock purchasing or selling decisions.
This could result in timing of equity financing opportunities for the firm. Based on this
information, this study can contribute to practice by adding information not only on the
fraudulent reporting that lead to the SOX Act, but also to the association between insider
trading patterns and EM citations for a randomly selected sample of publicly traded
companies after the enactment of the SOX Act. Based on this information, this study can
contribute to business practices by adding significant information on insider trading
patterns and earnings management.
Significance to Social Change
If earnings announcements leads to investment decisions, then the information
disseminated by corporations should be true and reliable as well as comparable. The
research questions posed in the study address the real-world problems of financial crisis
as well as fraudulent financial reporting that led to the enactment of the SOX Act of
2002. This may change, create, or revise reporting requirements for organizations. The
result of these outcomes of addressing fraudulent financial activities may lead to social
change that will rid the organizations, communities, and the society of the unethical
behavior.
The insight provided through this study may be able to help financial analyst and
practitioners to improve corporate social responsibility and corporate governance. The
research may also broaden insight of transparency as well as proper disclosure of the
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firm’s financial reports and books, enforcement of SEC and SOX rules and regulations,
and create shareholder activism in a vigorous way. This could be a possibility by
involving minority shareholder watchdog groups, thereby increasing minority
shareholder awareness.
Summary and Transition
Perceptions of investors have a direct influence on a corporation’s equity values
and stock pricing (Kolk, 2013). This could be important to corporate competitive
advantage and the nurturing of investor confidence in the business spectrum. Therefore, I
sought to discover what relationship existed between insider trading patterns and EM.
In Chapter 1, I introduced the consequences of insider trading and EM with
respect to its effect on the integrity of financial statement. Some researchers have noted
the absence of corporate governance by these corporations as highlighting this issue
while others have argued that authorities and agencies such as the SEC were not
proactive enough to spot fraudulent financial reporting before it occurred, whereas others
blamed the auditors and auditing firms. Consequently, the public, prospective investors,
regulators, auditors as well as other interested parties seem to have little faith, confidence,
or credence in corporations’ financial statements. In Chapter 2, I review the related
literature centering on prior research in the areas of insider trading and earning
management.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
I started the literature review by considering research on EM citations (Khan,
Mather, & Balachandran, 2014) and insider trading patterns (Chen et al., 2014) to begin
exploring their possible association (Kraft, Lee, & Lopatta, 2014). The literature covering
EM was extensive, but literature on insider trading patterns was limited and dated
(Kothari, Mizik, & Roychowdhury, 2015; Lo, Ramos, & Rogo, 2017; Sawicki &
Shrestha, 2014; Xue & Hong, 2016). I focused on a brief history of insider trading
patterns and EM citations. In the literature review, I explored the attributes of insider
trading and EM to see if abnormal profits are reported due to trading patterns (Ali &
Hirshleifer, 2016). Other researchers examined incentives and factors that drive insider
trading patterns (Dalko & Wang, 2016) and EM, efforts to mitigate and fight insider
trading and EM, key education from insider trading and EM and their role in firm
performance. Additionally, I explored research on executive compensation structure and
its adverse effect on management behavior (Almadi et al., 2016; Sheikh & Ali Shah,
2016), including incentive related to agency problems when it comes to options
compensation. Finally, I also explored literature on AEM and REM. In this chapter, I
provide a review of the literature and conclude with a discussion of the gap in research
and the ways in which this study may fill this gap.
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Literature Search Strategy
The literature search strategy includes use of publicly available secondary data
that are readily available and were obtained from the SEC, Compustat, and Institute of
Broker Estimates System, CDA Spectrum database, Execucomp database, NYSE,
Walden university library database, and edited accounting and auditing textbooks as well
as google scholar. The key search terms I used include earnings management, insider
trading, earnings manipulation, fraudulent financial reporting, information asymmetry,
accrual base earnings management, real earnings management, corporate governance,
corporate social responsibility, fraud, auditing, SOX Act of 2002, and stock base
compensation and corporate fraud.
I focused on the period between 2002 and 2012. The scope of the literature
review, in terms of years searched, followed the policy set by Walden University of
searching for articles published within the last 5 years. I saw a lot of literature on EM and
a limited amount of literature on insider trading or insider trading patterns. Because of the
limited amount of the literature on insider trading patterns, my study went beyond the 5year guideline, as some of the dated articles researched are important for proper analysis
of the period considered (Korczak, Korczak, & Lasfer, 2010). The type of literature
sources searched are journal articles surrounding the topic of my dissertation. I also
searched for past Walden and non-Walden dissertations related to my study as well as
peer-reviewed journals by using the ProQuest search engine, business source premier,
ABI/Inform, Thoreau, and Ebscohost.
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Theoretical Foundation
Theories are known to mean the assumptions, constructs, and facts that give a
reasonable explanation of cause and effect (Seaborn & Fels, 2015). Many theories work
in the financial spectrum to provide a solid foundation for this research study. The
theoretical framework for this study was based on the accounting, finance, and auditing
theories of Arens et al. (2014), Glover et al. (2014), Fruhan (1979); and Haugen (2001) as
well as financial theories of portfolio performance. These theories address the nature of
EM, corporate finance, risks and returns investments, cost of capital, auditing, and
assurance services with respect to firms’ managements of their earnings through
investments, and fees charged during audits engagements (deHaan et al., 2015). These
theories also address the nature of how investors value investment portfolios as well as
the governance needed to sustain the firm (Dittmar & Field, 2015). This framework is
supplemented using current research by Carter (2013), Chen and Huang (2013), and
Desir et al. (2014) in the areas of EM, corporate fraud, corporate governance, SOX, audit
fees, auditor independence, audit committee, corporate social responsibility audit
policies, and financial reporting and accounting scandals from 2000-2012. Additionally, I
used Gunny’s (2010) approach on the wealth creation, financial risk, securities valuation,
and financial decision processes as a foundation for the understanding of what EM means
and what is expected of the management of these firms, especially when it comes to
taking on risky investments that can harm the firm.
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Using the theoretical framework for this study, I built on past research studies that
have been conducted on what used to be common practice before the enactment of the
SOX Act in 2002 (Hossain et al., 2011). I also built on past research on corporate fraud
and its effects on firms’ post SOX Act (2000-2012) in publicly trading companies to see
if there is an effect on prevention of insider trading to boost EM. Through my study, I
examined the nature of EM, insider trading, corporate governance, corporate social
responsibility, audit fees, auditor independence, financial reporting, and how the public
as well as investors value the information that they receive.
In addition to the framework for this study, other theories are important to note as
they apply to examining financial businesses. For example, in corporate finance, the
pecking order theory postulates that the cost of financing increases with asymmetric
information when financing comes from three different sources: internal funds, debts, and
new equity. Donaldson first introduced the pecking order theory in 1961, and it was
modified in 1984 by Myers and Majluf. The theory indicates that companies give priority
to their source of financing by starting internally before using equity to finance projects
(Lemmon & Zender, 2016). However, there is asymmetric information due to managers
knowing more about the prospects of their companies. The managers’ risk and value
more than outside investors, as it is a choice between internal or external financing and
between debt or equity issue. Asymmetric information favors the issue of debt over
equity because debt signals the board’s confidence that an investment is profitable and
that the current stock price is undervalued (where stock price is over-valued, the issue of
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equity would be favored). On the other hand, the issue of equity signals a lack of
confidence in the board and constitutes that the share price is over-valued, and an issue of
equity leads to a decrease in share price. This theory related to my research, as it centers
on how information has been processed and how the information is delivered to the
outside investor.
Additionally, the accounting scandal of early 2000 and the financial crisis of 2008
left many investors wondering if they could still trust the market can caused researchers
such as Ma (2015) to look at the short comings of traditional financial theories as not
serving the needs of investors such as efficient market hypotheses and mean-variance
portfolio theory. As an alternative, the adaptive market hypothesis was proposed by Lo
(2004, 2005, and 2012). The adaptive market hypothesis suggests that there are
intelligent but fallible investors who adapt to the market’s changing conditions. This is
based on the amount of information that they have received, which supports the
importance of macro factors and the sentiments that drives assets returns. Ma also
introduced a framework theory to suggest that investors could expand or supplement their
investment decisions based on information received regarding economic changes,
regimes, ongoing market returns, and volatility of the market.
Another theory is the efficient market hypothesis, which is an investment theory
that states that it is impossible to outperform the market or “beat the market” because all
stock market efficiencies will make share prices incorporate and reflect relevant
information that is available for market transactions (Yusoff, Salleh, Ahmad, & Idris,
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2015). According to the efficient market hypothesis, stocks will always trade or sell at
their fair market value on stock exchanges. This makes purchasing undervalued stocks or
selling stocks at an inflated amount impossible for investors. Therefore, outperforming
the market through expert stock selection or market timing should be nearly impossible.
The only way for an investor to have a higher return is by purchasing investments that are
risky (Milian 2015). The efficient market hypothesis is the cornerstone of modern
financial theory; however, it is controversial, and many theorists have challenged this
theory. For example, Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, and Wang (2012) argued that not all
information is available or released, and Van Geyt, Van Cauwenberge, and Bauwhede
(2013) noted that insiders can profit from information at their disposal. Other challenges
come from examples like Warren Buffet, who have consistently beaten the market over
time, as well as events such as the 1987 stock market crash when the Dow Jones
Industrial Average fell below 20% in a single day, showing that share prices can deviate
from their fair value. Despite these challenges, this theory may or may not be accurate for
insider trading and EM, as insiders have access to information before it reaches the
outside investor (Agrawal & Cooper, 2015).
The adaptive market hypothesis, as mentioned earlier, was proposed by Lo (2004)
to reconcile economic theories based on the efficient market hypothesis, which led to a
behavioral market hypothesis that suggests that the market is consistent with behavioral
economics by applying the principles of evolution to financial interactions. Behavioral
theories state that an evolution happens in the market by emphasizing prior understanding
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and behaviors (Mirzaee Ghazani & Khalili Araghi, 2014). Researchers have shown that
the adaptive market hypothesis can be used to emphasize the importance of detecting a
nonlinear period, not only in time periods but also in the full-time series surrounding
financial events (Coronado Ramírez, Celso Arellano, & Rojas, 2015). This is important to
patterns of insider trading with respect to timing of information and trading that leads to
EM citation. The adaptive market hypothesis helps predict that markets are not efficient
but switch between times of sufficiency and times of inefficiency at different points. This
includes what could occur when corporate insiders have access to information at the
expense of investors or shareholders. This leads to the benefit or profit for themselves
and engagement in earnings manipulations before making the information available to
others.
Other researchers have proposed approaches to resolve any issues with the
adaptive market hypothesis or efficient market hypothesis. The adaptive investment
approach is an alignment between the adaptive market hypothesis and the efficient
market hypothesis (Rebaudo & Dangles, 2015). The adaptive investment approach theory
states that current and future investors could adjust their investment level on a continuous
basis to reflect the market conditions as well as protect against volatility of investment
(Rebaudo & Dangles, 2015).
Aside from the market hypotheses and the adaptive investment approach, the
arbitrage pricing theory is an asset pricing model based on the notion that a return on
asset could be predicted by using the relationship that exists between that asset and other
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common risk factors. The arbitrage pricing theory, first introduced in 1976 by Stephen
Ross, predicts the relationship between the returns of a single assets and the return of a
portfolio through a linear combination of many independent macroeconomic variables
(Huberman, 2005). The arbitrage pricing theory describes the price where a mispriced
asset is expected to be. It is often seen as an alternative to the capital asset pricing model
because the arbitrage pricing theory model has a more flexible assumption requirement,
but the capital asset pricing model formula requires the markets expected return. On the
other hand, arbitrage pricing theory uses the risky asset’s expected return as well as the
risk premium of several macroeconomic factors (Andriotto & Teti, 2014). Arbitrageurs
may use the arbitrage pricing theory to profit by taking advantage of mispriced securities,
which have prices that differ from the theoretical price predicted by the model (Raei,
Ahmadinia, & Hasbaei, 2011). By shorting an overpriced security, while going long in
the portfolio as the arbitrage pricing theory calculations were based on, the arbitrageur
can make a theoretically risk-free profit.
Moving past the capital asset pricing model allows for improved factors for
innovation and the optimization of the risk and return tradeoff and allows for the addition
of extra variables to an already accepted formula, thus improving knowledge (Fulga,
2015). For instance, Fulga (2015) also gave a description of the arbitrage pricing theory
to represent each added variable as a singular beta. Through the addition of each variable
beta, the linear equations that aided in the prediction of financial accuracy improved. By
adding insider trading patterns and EM, beta would aid in better financial predictability
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and decision-making for investors who lack certain information due to nondisclosure
practices of corporate insiders when it comes to stock options or buyback options
(Agrawal & Cooper 2015).
Another theory of model is the Black-Scholes model, which is based on the notion
that allowing for the purchasing and selling of some assets, the risk involved in the
purchasing through hedge funds is modified (Subramaniam & Jin Dong 2012). For
example, Subramanian and Jin Dong (2012) used the Black-Scholes model in
investigating the influence of executive market repricing when corporate managers
decide to take risks. It is possible that management might be able to mitigate the amount
of risks involved in their decisions if they are concerned with insider trading that might
lead to EM or earnings manipulation at the detriments of investors or shareholders.
Finally, an important assumption in financial theory is the behavioral theory. The
behavioral theory states that there are certain circumstances where individuals are faced
with certain constraints. An example is when compensation is based on performance,
individuals will attempt to maximize any opportunity and seek the greatest profit possible
either for personal gain or for increased value of the firm (Agrawal & Cooper 2015).
There are some signals sent out into the market that stem from corporate insiders’ desires
to maximize every opportunity that they have at their disposal based on the information
they have to share with shareholders or investors to make informed decision; however,
some have argued that this happens on a rare basis (Grazzini, 2013). Additionally,
behavioral theory has been used to analyze labor economics to look at the exploitation
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employed by management with a clear description of an emphasis on its relational nature
in labor and income allocation (Yoshihara & Veneziani, 2013). Therefore, behavioral
theory may apply to the profit maximization sought by corporate insiders who engage in
insider trading. This leads to EM either in a positive or negative way, which can be
applied to other industries. The behavioral theory may explain the modified the desires of
corporate insiders. Stakeholders in the publicly traded firms seek optimal maximization
of profit that will increase the firm value by putting out correct and reliable information
for everyone to see and use at the same time and make well-informed decisions.
Financial Theories
Insider trading activities and EM is a huge part of the accounting and finance
literature, the review in this research will not be complete without considering the
financial theory that has guided the public corporations. Timing is important when it
comes to share pricing as the market reacts to the environment and what is happening
within the economy at every time of the day. Dittmar and Field (2015) asserted that there
is a chance of repurchase pricing adjustment in favor of market timing announcements.
Dittmar and Field investigated corporate managers using different methods of stock
repurchase pricing to see if the market was timed when corporate negotiation decision
was made regarding issuance and repurchase of securities.
Dittmar and Field (2015) analyzed current and past research literature and found
supporting evidence for market-timing hypotheses. However, they concluded that the
results remain unclear. One of the reason given for the lack of unclear conclusion is based
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on the long-run horizons of the amount of work involved after the announcement events,
as well as clear evidence that showing firms making announcements regarding their
intentions to repurchase and do not always follow through. This leads to a legitimate
question regarding the intent of making the announcement. Other reasons given by
Dittmar and Field for the lack of clarity in the literatures was that repurchases were often
based on quarterly or annual data regarding the amount paid for such securities and not
the purchase prices paid for such exchanges.
In their research, Dittmar and Field (2015) used monthly data relating to
repurchase pricing that are included and found in the 10-K and 10-Q filings of these firms
with the Securities Exchange Commission electronic data gathering, as well as retrieval
database. They retrieved security price averaging through the Center for Research in
Securities Pricing. They used these tools to ascertain if corporations are capable of timing
the market in an effort of repurchasing their stocks. Their sample consisted of 2,237 firms
and 38,900 firm-months during the periods of 2004 and 2011.
In conclusion, Dittmar and Field (2015) showed that mispricing was evident in
the period covered when the decision was made by the corporation to announce their
intention with respect to repurchasing. They scrutinized the prices paid for such
repurchases, as well as how these were related to the announcements. They showed that
information asymmetry, analyst forecasting, as well as stated motivation were all related
to pricing on the market. The researchers showed that corporations pay less prices for
repurchasing of stock after a price run down of the stock and even pay a much lower
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price after a downturn of the market. After controlling for the Fama-French indicators,
Dittmar and Field (2015) noted that corporations showed a positive alpha of .3%
monthly, during the 3-year period that followed the purchase of the securities. The above
assortment is an indication that market announcements could be of benefit to
organizations during insider trading activities that can lead to increase in earnings.
Increase earnings, therefore, can lead to the determining how financial analysts can use
other corporate announcements to control their own stock valuation opportunities. Thus,
if this theory is deemed correct, then the announcements made by the executive
management officials could also lead to changes in stock pricing or stock price
abnormalities.
Earnings management also has to do with timing of announcements. DeHaan et
al. (2015) asserted that there is a direct influence on stock pricing that changes due to a
well-calculated timing of earning management announcements, which could also lead to
abnormalities. Their study also included critically investigating and examining hidden
information and the announcements of information with respect to earnings, as well as
the effect these conflicting activities may have on stock return pricing in the periods of
good versus poor market attention (deHaan et al., 2015). If concealing or revealing
earnings creates variances in abnormal stock returns, then concealing and showing other
appropriate corporate facts could also result in homogeneous results.
In conclusion, deHann et al. (2015) argued that there are three required conditions
that must exist for this plan to work. Primarily, corporate managers must change the
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timing of these announcements as this may give cause to investors to see exactly and
precisely what they are attempting to conceal from them. Second, foreseeable variation
patterns in investor paying attention are required for this plan to work. Finally, they
insisted on the requirement of the practice of corporate management tendency to
announce the changes in earning to be dependent on the market changing conditions.
DeHaan et al. (2015) chose the period of 11 years spanning from 2000 to 2011 for
their research study, adding credibility to the time period selection of my research study,
which is 2002-2012. DeHann et al. (2015) used three dimensions for the announcements
taking place, including the time of day the annoucements originated, the day of the week
the announcements originated, and as the market business of the particular announcement
date and the period. They conducted a quantitative regression analysis test to investigate
the three market attention variables mentioned, and concluded that there is credible
evidence to support their analysis, given certain situaution and circumstances, that timing
of the information does influence the announcement of stock pricing (deHaan et al.,
2015). These findings gives credence to the theory showing that other announcements
could also influence stock pricing either from insider trading activities and earnings
manipulation. Within the accounting and financial industry, this is an important
theoretical basis to follow.
When corporations decide to manage their earnings either through AEM or REM,
as inisders with first hand knowledge of information, they have the first chance of
opportunity to announce these actions in a truthful manner. They also have the chance of

34
picking and choosing the timing of the announcements (Spatt, 2014). It is a fact that firms
that utilize the best form of execution for investments and announcements based on truth
and relaible information, as well as the other factors considred, are seen to have an
increased chance and opportunity for improved financial performance. Spatt (2014) noted
that some participants in the market tend to influence market prices in a false manner so
as to obtain higher pricing for themselves in the case of an insider trading activity which
will lead to earnings manipulation, but created a clear distinction between the market
actions as well as trades. Spatt argued that some market participants may conduct trades
in other to create distortion in prices. Spatt also noted that these types of trades and
actions would lead to both wealth redistribution and inefficient market pricing as in the
case of insider trading activities.
Literature Review
Earnings Management
I focused on literature involving EM. Earnings Management is a process that
happens when managers make decisions on their own with respect to what financial
numbers to include on the firm’s financial reports, to manage or influence the
corporation’s financial performance (earnings; Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). In the
context of AEM, which is within the realm of GAAP choices that try to obscure or mask
the true economic performance of a firm (Dechow & Skinner, 2000), or REM, which
happens when managers undertake actions or make decisions that deviate from best
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practices to increase the amount of earnings reported. In the following section, I explore
the literature surrounding these issues as well as highlight the most relevant studies.
I also examined managerial opportunism, a situation in which managers
manipulate their earnings numbers for individual or personal gain. The focus is on if
corporate executive managers engage in performing earnings manipulations to meet or
exceed the market forecast during periods of insider trades, i.e. the benchmark beating
game. There is a large amount of literature discussing the different methods, incidence,
motivations, and consequences of EM, because a considerable amount of attention has
been given to it in the academic literature in the past decade (Olsen & Zaman, 2013; Wai
Kong Cheung, 2011).
Most researchers have focused on different aspect of this issue as most
researchers have investigated different aspects of the problem and coming up with
varying contradicting results. Some studies, such as Olsen and Zaman (2013), involved
investigation of executive managers’ motivations to manage earnings either upwards or
downwards, by examining the patterns of insider trading associated with EM as well as
the consequences of such actions, whether regulatory enforcement or stock market
reactions.
Olsen and Zaman (2013) developed and tested three possible hypotheses on
signaling, opportunism, as well as smoothing. The result of their findings was that the
buying trades of insiders reduced in frequency relative to the selling trades as earnings
are managed upwards. Second, the trading patterns of insiders still holds after controlling

36
for size and finally, the trading patterns is still present within the categories of past
returns when the samples were partitioned concluding that this is consistent with
opportunism (Olsen & Zaman, 2013).
Prior research (e.g., Olsen & Zaman, 2013) showed that there are associations
between some earnings benchmarks and EM. The literature divides or break earnings into
two parts, discretionary and nondiscretionary earnings. The discretionary accrual can
proxy for the discretionary or managed portion of earnings and the accruals have been
shown to be related to benchmarks that are based on bonus compensation schemes as this
is one way the earnings are managed to benefit managers in a decision-making position
(Olsen & Zaman, 2013). A corporation’s discretionary accruals have to zero out over
time; this implication is that when earnings are managed in the current period, it will
impact future periods’ earnings in the opposite direction when the discretionary accruals
eventually reverse because executive managers have the expectations that the
nondiscretionary earnings will change in future periods as argued by Olsen and Zaman
(2013). Furthermore, Olsen and Zaman (2013) argued that if subsequent nondiscretionary
earnings are expected to change, the level of impact from the reversal from previous
income values of discretionary accruals on the deviation of subsequent earnings would
either be partially or fully mitigated by the change in nondiscretionary earnings. Thus,
concluding that the effect of managing earnings toward a benchmark in any given period
can either enhance or inhibit the corporation’s ability to meet a benchmark in future
periods (Olsen & Zaman, 2013).
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In their analysis, Olsen and Zaman (2013) used three different hypotheses for
their study; opportunism, signaling, and smoothing. For opportunism, their hypothesis
was defined as a situation where insider trades are motivated in part by private
information and knowledge concerning equity values along with the fact that outside
investors do not understand the nature and persistence of accruals. Under this hypothesis,
managerial discretion over accruals could be viewed as a means of either delaying or
misleading outside investors because managers may be able to manipulate earnings
upward to avoid adverse contractual consequences or to hide the corporations’ actual
deteriorating performance. Additionally, Olsen and Zaman argued that there is evidence
to prove that upward EM abounds when the corporation is close to a debt agreement
violation. Vice versa, managers are also able to use their discretion to manage earnings
downwards when future performance is expected to be good as this income decreasing
EM could also indicate the strength of the corporation by conveying the notion that the
corporation is able to withstand additional expenses and remain profitable.
For the signaling hypothesis, Olsen and Zaman (2013) posited that managers use
discretionary accruals to communicate their future performance expectations to outsiders
“as managerial discretion is a means that managers use to reveal to outside investors
about their private expectations about the corporation’s future cash flows” as stated by
Beneish (2001, p. 3). Healy and Whalen (1998) also reflected this view when they
asserted that managers can also use accounting judgment to make financial reports more
informative if, for example, certain accounting choices or estimates are perceived to be
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costly and therefore credible signals of a firm’s financial performance. For the above
scenario, Olsen and Zaman (2013) argued that downward EM could be viewed as a sign
of future deteriorating performance, because the notion now is that earnings for the
current periods are been saved for the future period when performance is expected to be
on the decline relative to the current period’s unmanaged earnings.
In their third hypothesis, which is smoothing, Olsen and Zaman (2013) posited
that earnings are managed for other reasons than opportunism or signaling; under this
hypothesis, managerial discretion over accruals is presumed to be related to intertemporal
smoothing for temporary earnings shocks to be able to reduce the variability in the
reported earnings. This is in line with the findings of Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal’s
(2005) survey of chief financial officers. The results showed 96.9% of respondents
preferred smooth earnings and 78% of respondents would rather give up economic value
in exchange of smooth earnings. Motivation for smooth earnings vary for various reasons
to include job security, bonuses, as well as providing empirical evidence supporting the
fact that managers do consider both current and future earnings performance when
exercising discretion over accruals.
According to Olsen and Zaman (2013), income smoothing could also enhance the
informational value of the corporation. This could also result in higher market value as
well as lower the perception of market-related risk, because volatile earnings could lead
to a greater information advantage for informed investors. This could also lead to a
situation of where uninformed investors would prefer smooth earnings by mangers, as
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evidence suggest that managers have incentives to reduce the volatility in reported
earnings by smoothing (Olsen & Zaman, 2013).
Earnings Management and Forecast
McVay, Nagar, and Wei Tang (2006) investigated and analyzed the behavior of
analyst where the presence of managerial incentives is felt in other to meet or slightly
exceed analysts’ forecasts. McVay et al. investigated stock sales as a managerial
incentive to describe the discontinuity surrounding analyst forecast benchmark. They
argued that the likelihood of just meeting analyst forecast versus missing the analyst
forecast is strongly related to subsequent managerial stock sales. They provided stark
evidence that executive managers sometimes manage their earnings prior to meeting the
threshold as well as selling their shares. McVay et al. concluded with evidence that the
relationship between just meeting and eventually selling share does not hold true for nonexecutive insider managers. This finding is because they do not have the ability to affect
earnings outcome, as well as been weaker in the presence of an independent board,
thereby suggesting that good corporate governance does mitigates this type of strategic
behavior.
Luo et al. (2013) argued that corporate managers have huge discretion in the
determination of forecast characteristics; however, little is known on how managerial
incentives affects these characteristics. Their research study investigated whether
executive managers choose forecast precision in a strategic manner for self-gain. Luo et
al. built their research on prior findings that the market reaction to vague forecast is
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weaker than when the reaction is based on precise forecast. They provided evidence that
forecast disclosed by executive management before insider sales, more positive news
forecasts are more precise than other management forecasts, while the opposite holds true
for more negative forecasts. Luo et al. stated further that the relationship is inverted for
management forecast that are disclosed before insider purchases.
In conclusion, Luo et al. (2013) stated that the results of their analysis are
consistent with managers that choose forecast strategically in a precise manner which
ultimately leads to increased stock prices before insider sales and to decreased stock
prices before insider purchases. Further analyses indicated the impact of managerial
incentives on precision forecast is less conspicuous when institutional ownership is high
or when the risk of disclosure is high, and is more conspicuous when investors are having
a hard time assessing the information at the disposal of the precision of managers (Luo et
al., 2013).
There is also a large body of literature discussing the efficacy of EM models like
AEM and REM as well as income smoothing topic and their ability to precisely predict
EM as well as precisely classify accruals as discretionary and non-discretionary.
Buckmaster (2001) furnished a comprehensive reflection of income smoothing topics
over the past decade. The researcher found evidence showing that the balance sheet is the
focal point in an early income smoothing activity. This finding is in respect to how
managers create secret reserves to avoid distributing dividends to shareholders. Dating
back to the 19th century, Matheson (1893) provided evidence showing that recording a

41
large depreciation amount in years that the business is prospering, was one of the method
used in creating secret reserve accounts. However, based on those early papers touching
on the topic of income smoothing, Paton (1932) argued against varying depreciation
charges as a mechanism to obtain smooth income streams.
Acharya and Lambrecht (2015) developed a theory of income and payout
smoothing by corporate firms. This is applicable to situations where insiders have more
information about income than outside shareholders. However, property rights have
ensured that outsiders can enforce a fair payout based on the methods used citing Kohler
(1933). The argument was made by Kohler that a corporation’s operational risks should
not be concealed by different methods of accounting. The reason given was that corporate
insiders can set payout to meet outsiders’ expectations and then turn around to under
produce in other to manage future expectations downwards using the same or varying
accounting methods. Acharya and Lambrecht (2015) observed income and payout
processes are smooth, and they adjust partially in the short run and over time in response
to economic shocks. Acharya and Lambrecht referred to the researcher of Gordon (1964),
who made an argument that accounting practices should be carefully selected in a way
that will reduce the variability between current and future earnings. The reason was that
the smaller the inside ownership, the more severe underproduction is, which will result in
an “outside equity Laffer curve.” Their understanding was because selecting accounting
practices to smooth income will allow stockholders to better evaluate the prospects of the
corporation. This research study was significant because the purpose of accounting is to

42
maximize wealth for the benefit of the corporation to increase its value rather than
measure it. However, in contrast to earlier research studies that normatively investigated
accounting practices, later and more current research studies empirically examined the
consequences of EM decisions on behalf of corporate managers.
Looking at the more recent research that investigated the topic of income
smoothing as it related to EM and insider trading patterns, Shu and Thomas (2016)
argued that EM have failed to fool the market, as well as also noting that its profitability
to managers is somewhat doubtful. The introduction of different computerized techniques
in conducting research in modern times saw an increase in more research into the
investigation of the relationship between accounting choices and stock price effects. Shu
and Thomas noted that such studies were also conducted by Kaplan and Roll (1972) and
Ball (1972). The researchers found no relationship between changes in accounting
techniques and stock prices. This lead up to Healy’s (1985) study and Buckmaster (2001)
to list 107 pertinent research studies in the topic of income smoothing. These arguments
only indicated that the literature on the topic of income smoothing is at the heart of
accounting research, as well as noting that the various methods, motivations, and results
of income smoothing have been of paramount interest to practitioners and researchers
alike (Shu & Thomas, 2016).
Executive Compensation
Healy’s (1985) research was important to the present study because Healy was the
first to relate insider trading patterns to EM patterns and how they are tied to executive
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compensation. Healy’s research shows that managers can manipulate earnings in their
favor so as to increase their compensation from bonus plans. Through this study, I extend
past research, such as Healy’s (1985), by investigating the relationship that exists
between insider trading patterns and EM citations.
Many researchers have examined different causes, techniques, and consequences
of EM decisions, while other research have investigated managerial wealth creation by
executive managers that are related to incentives for earnings manipulations (e.g., Healy,
1985). Some more recent studies examined issues of earnings manipulation and
compensation structure and how it relates to insider trading. First, McVay et al. (2006)
noted that there is a higher occurrence of meeting consensus forecast by executive
managers that sell their stocks which is a proxy for EM.
Second, Denis and Xu (2013), Li et al. (2016), and Sheikh and Ali Shah (2016) all
identified links tying corporate executive compensation and future insider trading
together and they all argued that their links are brought together by EM. In this research
study, I examined the association insider trading patterns and EM citations. I utilized
established empirical techniques to detect EM. At the time of this study, there was no
consensus in the EM literature about the different methods, frequency, as well as the
consequences of EM.
Earnings Management and Accruals
For the purposes of this study, the assumption stemming from previous research
was that EM by executives may not always be fully detected by prospective investors
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evaluating the firm. Additionally, EM as originally measured by the Jones or modified
Jones model (Jones 1991) is a proxy for such earnings manipulation (Bartov et al., 2017;
Dechow et al. 1995; Godsell et al., 2017; Lo et al., 2017). Jones’s (1991) original
research study involved an investigation to determine whether companies that stand to
benefit from import-relief investigations have the tendency to manage earnings
downwards. Jones research study developed a measurement methodology that helps to
estimate the discretionary component of total accruals, which in turn is a measure of EM.
Jones (1991) developed a model expectation that was specific to firms. The model
measures normal accruals, the expectations model helps controls for the relationship
between economic conditions as well as the level of total accruals. Jones’s findings
indicated that during import-relief investigations, executives decrease firm income by
reporting income-reducing discretionary accruals. Jones developed a methodology that
went beyond previous methodologies used to measure EM. Past research studies either
investigated single accruals or total accruals as a proxy for EM. Thus, the development of
a large-sample estimation procedure for EM by Jones became one of the most popular
methodologies as it has many variants that are attempting to improve on the original
model (Bartov et al., 2017; Godsell et al., 2017; Jones 1991).
As with all studies, Jones’ methodology was not without criticisms, as other
several ensuing research studies opposed or disputed the efficacy of the Jones (1991)
model that is used in detecting EM. Amid the researchers who investigated different
methodological issues in detecting EM, Bartov et al. (2017) and Dechow et al. (1995)
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evaluated the ability of separate models to detect EM. They did find that a more modified
version of the Jones’ model actually produces the most powerful way to identify EM.
However, for all the different models, the power of the tests is considerably low for EM
of reasonable magnitudes. This is an indication that the Jones model or its variants
identifies EM with error.
Thomas and Zhang (2001) and Fields et al. (2016) examined the accuracy of six
different accrual prediction models. Their findings indicated that apart from the Kang and
Sivaramakrishnan’s (1995) model, which other researchers also replicated (Baber et al.,
2011; Fields et al., 2016; McNichols, 2001; Thomas & Zhang, 2001). The remaining five
models’ ability to be able to predict total accruals was seen to be less accurate than a
naïve model that was able to predict total accruals equaling 5% of total assets. Bernard
and Skinner (1996) and Dong and Wang (2017) also recognized some of the problems
associated with the extant discretionary accrual models and they recommend that
developing a better and more specified model of the accrual process would be
appropriate. These authors advocated for the modeling of accruals in an industry or
modeling particular components of accruals.
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) proposed two separate models that can be
used to detect EM: the first one is based on an instrumental variable approach, and the
second one is based on utilizing a generalized process of moment estimation procedure.
Simulations were conducted in other to be able to evaluate the efficiency of these models
that was proposed as compared to that proposed by Jones. At the end of the test, their
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findings showed that their model was more powerful and more robust to Type 1 errors
than that proposed by Jones model (Kang & Sivaramakrishnan, 1995).
Other researchers also contributed to the research on EM. Some of these
researchers discussed trade-offs associated with the three most commonly used research
designs in the EM literature (Beaver et al., 2016; Diane et al., 2016; McNichols, 2000,
2001; Thomas & Zhang, 2001). The first study employed aggregate accruals, the second
study was based on specific accruals, and finally studies that are based on the distribution
of earnings. Beaver et al.'s (2016) argued that because of the possibility in
misspecification that are associated with the Jones’ models, the assumption is that
research studies based on them may not be reliable enough to assess the extent of EM in
the contexts that is of interest to researchers. Beaver et al. noted that further contribution
to the literature will come from researchers who investigate EM based on industryspecific contexts or researchers who able to investigate specific accruals. McNichols
(2001) also predicted future contributions from research studies that examine the
distributional properties of earnings after EM where there is a strong managerial
incentive to meet or to exceed targeted earnings. McNichols specifically surmised that
corporations that have greater expected growth are more likely to have greater accruals
vis-à-vis corporations that have less expected earnings growth.
Other researchers also added to the discussion in an identical line of thinking.
Researchers like (Abbadi et al., 2016; Chowdhury, et al., 2017;Guay et al. 1996; Leung et
al., 2017; Pham et al., 2017; Subramanyam 1996) engaged in the investigation of
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different models of discretionary accrual in a managerial contest. Of all the tests carried
out, three managerial discretion hypotheses with different models were carried out. The
first hypotheses was the performance measurement hypothesis, the second one was the
opportunistic hypothesis, and the third was based on noise hypotheses. Based on the
result of the tests carried out, five extant models accurately estimated accruals that
resulted from management opportunism based on the jones and modified Jones’ models,
other models tested count not be distinguished from random splits of accruals into
discretionary and non-discretionary components.
Other than the Jones (1991) model, along with its variants, the literature on EM
has advanced and introduce various and other techniques in which one can use to
measure such earnings manipulations (Amar & Chabchoub 2016; Burgstahler & Dichev
1997; Degiannakis et al., 2017; Leung et al., 2017; Pham et al., 2017). Burgstahler and
Dichev (1997) introduced a non-parametric methodology that they used to detect EM.
These researchers relied on the distributional properties of earnings so as to be able to
visually investigate the incidence that may be associated with certain earnings numbers,
their findings showed that firms engage in EM so as to be able to circumvent earnings
decreases and losses. Further testing was carried out in cross-sectional distributions of
earnings, and their findings also showed that there is an unusually low frequency of
corporations that have minimal reduction in earnings or reduced losses.
Barton and Simko (2002), on the other hand, were able to devise a parametric
model that may aid in the measurement of managerial flexibility in the EM literature.
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Other researchers have utilized this model (Andreas, 2017; Chan et al., 2015; Garven &
Taylor, 2015; Greiner, 2016; Greiner et al., 2017). Barton and Simko argued that the
balance sheet accumulates the effects of previous accounting choices, so the level of net
assets partly reflects the extent of previous EM. Their prediction was that the ability of
managers to optimistically bias earnings decreases with the extent to which the balance
sheet would overstate net assets that are relative to a neutral application of GAAP. To test
this prediction, Barton and Simko investigated the likelihood of reporting various
earnings surprises for 3,649 corporations from 1993–1999. Their findings showed that
the likelihood of reporting larger or smaller negative earnings surprises decreases with
their proxy for overstated net asset value. This was consistent with their prediction.
Barton and Simko also utilized the beginning balance of net operating assets relative to
sales as a proxy for income-increasing EM. They defined net operating assets as equity
minus cash, liquid securities, and total debt. NOA is a proxy for accrual-based measures
of operational net assets.
Barton and Simko (2002) were able to provide proof that net operating assets can
capture previous optimism in the financial reporting process by showing that it is
positively associated with larger cumulative levels of positive accruals in the past. I
attempted to identify unmanaged performance by subtracting the discretionary portion of
earnings from total earnings. Other researchers have used this same methodology
(Shrieves & Gao, 2002; Sun, 2014; Wang et al., 2014). However, this model has received
significant criticism. Similar to Jones’s 1991 model, this methodology is also
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controversial. Regardless of the criticisms, the Jones model remains the most commonly
and widely used model in the measurement of EM (Beneish, 2001; Beneish, Hopkins et
al., 2005; Caruso, Ferrari et al., 2016; Wilson, 2015) along with various other research
studies augmenting the tests with the non-parametric approach that Burgstahler and
Dichev (1997) developed. For the purposes of this research study, the modified Jones
model (Dechow et al., 1995) was utilized to measure the discretionary portion of
earnings, because past research studies have corroborated it to be the most effective in the
detection of accruals that nay result from management opportunism.
As the Jones model (1991) and its variants have been recognized to measure EM
with some error, through this study I attempted to be precise and make up for such errors
by utilizing an alternative measure for EM. Barton and Simko’s (2001) measure
described is one such alternative and specification. However, their measure is also related
to Jones’s measure; therefore, there is the possibility that this might also suffer from
similar biases. To limit the amount of bias due to utilizing such measure, this study also
utilized the distributional properties of earnings (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997) in some of
the tests, but, this EM measure is incompatible for use with most tests.
Accrual Earnings Management
A review of the literature on EM would not be complete without looking at the
various methods that firms use in the management of their earnings. The different
methods of EM used by corporations include AEM, REM, and classification shifting.
Prior to the enactment of the SOX Act of 2002, most firms used AEM as a method of EM
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which is mostly preferred by GAAP. REM is also used, GAAP does not frown on the use
of REM or classification shifting but recommends AEM since most firms depends on
their accruals for financial reporting.
The literature on EM and the different methods of EM is exhaustive as can be
seen from past researchers such as (Abernathy et al., 2014; Curtis et al., 2013; Doukakis
2014; Gao et al., 2017; GaoIpino & Parbonetti 2017; Kothari et al., 2015; McVay et al.,
2006; Roychowdhury 2006). These researchers have commented extensively on EM
looking at it from different angles to see why and what is behind the motive for managing
earnings for their firms the way they did.
Firms use different techniques in the management of their earnings. However, the
focus has been placed on three methods that is widely used, with a focus on AEM as
there is documented proof in several contexts, using different accruals, and also in
response to many managerial incentives (Abernathy et al., 2014). AEM is said to happen
when executive use discretionary accruals borrow earnings from future periods in other to
increase their current period earnings or on the opposite, push their earnings from the
current period in future period to be able to reduce current earnings. This will increase the
cost of AEM used for current earnings, this in addition to the cost of detection will result
in a reduction of one-to-one future earnings (Abernathy et al., 2014). They argued that
doing this would lower future period earnings in a mechanical way because of net income
that have been accelerated to the current period. They further stated that there is cost and
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constraint involved in the use of AEM and executive managers should ensure that the
benefits out way the cost of using AEM when making decisions.
Real Earnings Management
Real earnings management is another method used by firms to manage their
earnings. There is no clear definition of REM. However, (Abernathy et al., 2014) argued
that it is a process that occurs when executive managers move away from high business
decisions with real activities like over production in other to lower cost of goods sold,
reducing discretionary expenditures like research and development in other to be able to
meet earnings target. Initially, the literature on REM was mainly focused on how REM is
used to manipulate research and development expenditures in other to improve the firm’s
current operating results (Baber et al., 1991; Bushee, 1998; Dechow & Sloan, 1991).
Because firms used REM to manipulate earnings through research and development,
other researchers conducted studies to determine whether corporations use REM to
manipulate earnings. Thus, there was the motivation to do further research on the use of
REM. Graham et al. (2005) carried out a survey and interviewed more than 400 corporate
executives in other to determine some of the factors that drive reported earnings and
disclosure decisions. Their findings showed that managers are willing to take economic
actions that would rather have a long term negative effects on the firm rather than make
decision that within GAAP accounting choices to manage their earnings. The study
showed that 78% of their respondents admitted to sacrificing long-term value to smooth
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earnings, along with working to maintain predictability in earnings and financial
disclosure.
Graham et al.’s (2005) findings are also consistent with the result of Chowdhury’s
(2006) research, in which the author provided empirical proof to show that executives
managers manipulate earnings to circumvent the reporting of annual losses or missing
forecast by analyst using real activities measures. Specifically, Chowdhury’s research
shows that managers engage in the manipulation of sales to decrease their discretionary
expenses and engage in the overproduction of inventories to reduce cost of goods sold, so
as to improve their reported margins. Chowdhury conducted a cross sectional analysis
and revealed that these activities are not that prevalent in the presence of investors that
are sophisticated. The researcher also argued other factors influence real activities
manipulations. These includes membership in the industry, the stock of inventories and
receivables as well as incentives to meet zero earnings.
Other researchers studied different types of REM that can be used in the process
of earning management. Methods such as sale of profitable assets as researched by
(Bartov, 1993; Herrmann et al., 2003). They presented empirical investigation to show
weather executive managers engage in earnings manipulation with the timing of income
recognition from the disposal of long-lived assets and investments. Researchers studied
sales price reductions (Gao et al., 2017; Jackson & Wilcox 2000; Sun & Liu, 2016; Xu et
al., 2007). Researchers have investigated the method of derivative hedging, stock
repurchases, securitizations, and cutting advertising expenses (Barton, 2001; Cohen et al.,
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2010; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Dechow et al., 2009; Galdi et al., 2016; Hribar et al.,
2006; Huang et al., 2017; Jackson & Wilcox 2000; Lovata et al., 2016; Sun & Liu 2016).
Earnings manipulation through real activities by executive managers has the
propensity to increase revenue, but it comes with a cost associated with it. For instance, if
research and development expenses are reduced to improve the current year net income,
there is a possibility that the corporations’ future performance will be hurt due to the lost
opportunities from the reduced research and development. Thus, the question that is
asked is what is driving this decision-making process, could be associated with inside
information that is only privy to the managers of the firm? As noted above, earnings
manipulation using REM by managers is not a GAAP violation, it is just a questionable
business decision making process.
McVay et al. (2006) argued that the cost associated with the detection of REM is
lower than AEM. After the passage of the SOX, evidential proof from investigation
carried out showed that there was a reduction in the use of AEM and an uptick in the use
of REM (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen & Zarowin 2010; Huang et al., 2017). These findings
provided evidence that there is an increase in REM when AEM is constrained or if the
cost of detection is highly significant.
Zang (2012), on the other hand, argued that the cost of detection is not limited to
just the two methods of EM. The researcher examined the trade-off decision faced by
executive management between the use of either AEM or REM. Zang’s research was
based on the premise of if executive managers engage the use real activities earnings
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manipulation and AEM as substitutes in managing earnings. The results showed that
executive managers do a trade-off between the two EM methods based on their relative
costs stating further that executives adjust the level of AEM in accordance to the level of
real activities manipulation that is realized. Zang used an empirical model to incorporate
the costs associated with the two EM methods as well as to capture executive
management’s sequential decisions. The researcher documented a large-sample of
evidence consistent with managers using real activities manipulation and AEM as
substitutes (Zang, 2012).
Classification Shifting
Classification shifting is another method of EM. McVay (2006) defined
classification shifting as a process of misclassifying items within the income statement
while net income remains constant. Classification shifting includes shifting expenditures
from the operating expenses to non-recurring expenses to increase earnings (Abernathy,
Beyer et al., 2014). Although the misclassification of items within the income statement
remain harmless because net income remains constant, the information embedded in the
different income statement line item is useful to financial statement users (Abernathy et
al., 2014). McVay provided proof to support his claim that there is classification shifting
between operating expenditures and special items. This is because permanent line items
in the income statement are closer to the top which is an indication of a higher likelihood
of persistence into the future. On the other hand, transient line items in the income
statement that are less likely to continue are closer to the bottom of the statement. Thus,
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classification shifting gives a misrepresentation of persistent line items in the income
statement and as a result, have the possibility of misleading investors with respect to
future performance of the corporation (Abernathy et al., 2014).
Still on the topic of classification shifting, current research proposes that
corporations are engaging in classification shifting by moving operating expenses to
revenue-reducing discontinued operations to increase their core earnings (Abernathy et
al., 2014; Barua et al., 2010). In his investigation on classification shifting, McVay
(2006) sampled some U.S corporation and finds that classification shifting is more
prevalent when corporations can meet or exceed analyst forecasts. More evidence
provided showed that classification shifting is more eminent in the fourth quarter and
there is the likelihood that executive managers will engage the use of classification
shifting when there is a constrained on them not to use AEM (Abernathy et al., 2014).
Past studies have provided evidential proofs that corporations make the move
from AEM to REM when they see that their ability to engage in AEM is constrained. For
instance, Cohen et al. (2008) showed proof that corporations have made the switch from
AEM to REM after the passage of SOX, which placed high regulatory emphasis on
AEM. In a similar manner, Chi et al. (2011) found that corporations that was audited by
high quality auditors are more likely to utilize REM because they also see that their
ability to manipulate accruals is constrained. Additionally, Badertscher (2011) argued
that corporations that are overvalued switch from AEM to REM as they run out of
accruals management options to sustain their overvalued equity, while Cohen and
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Zarowin (2010) provided evidence that corporations choose to engage in the use of REM
around the time of seasoned equity offerings based on the costs related to AEM. Zang
(2012) further provided proof that executives utilize AEM and REM as a substitution.
She noted that the trade-off decision is based on the relative costliness of each EM
strategy. Furthermore, she is of the assumption that executive adjust the level of AEM
according to the realized level of REM. Although the above research provides evidence
and document a trade-off between REM and AEM, to my knowledge, I have not seen any
other research study that includes an investigation of the trade-off between REM and
classification shifting while considering associated constraints and how it relates to
insider trading patterns (Abernathy et al., 2014).
Researchers examining EM have begun to study all three forms of EM together
but none on the three forms with insider trading patterns. For instance, Athanasakou et al.
(2011) examined the stock market response to meeting analyst earnings expectations that
are associated with EM (AEM, REM, and classification shifting) and earnings forecast
guidance strategies. The researchers found corporations that use classification shifting to
meet analyst expectations receive a lower market reward than those corporations that are
genuinely meeting or beat the earnings target. Their research highlights that there are
three earning management techniques available to executive managers that can be used to
manipulate earnings, and researchers and regulators should consider all three techniques
(Abernathy et al., 2014).
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Insider Trading, and Trading Profits
The literature on insider trading includes findings associated with EM, such as the
motivations for EM. Some of the studies have been focused on the extent to which
executive managers will alter reported earnings for their own benefit as prior studies have
provided evidence of as association between managers contractual agreements and
earnings patterns (Olsen & Zaman, 2013). The securities act of 1934 welcomed a new
dawn in the way business is conducted due to its ratification. This era changed many
aspects of stock-exchange dealings, to include the regulation of stock trades by officers,
directors, and large shareholders of corporations (Fox & Fox, 2016; Mas, 2016; Smith
1940).
After the regulation was enacted, it was required that insiders file the number of
shares they own in their respective firms, as well as to report the sales and purchases of
any such stock to the SEC by the 10th of the following month as required by the law.
This was required because if insiders make profits as a result of their purchasing and
selling activities within a period of six months, the corporation is entitled to recover such
profits (Chen & Huang, 2014; Olsen & Zaman, 2013; Sawicki & Shrestha, 2014; Smith,
1940). The motive behind these restrictions on insider trading was to level the playing
field that existed between participants in the market, executive managers, company
officers as well as institutional investors, and more so especially the small investors.
However, there is still this nagging questions that locks around the issue of whether
insiders are profiting abnormally from their trades. This is still a thorny issue in
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regulatory circles, the media, the academic world as well as the investing public, because
there is an overwhelming evidence that points toward the existence of such a
phenomenon (Byun & Roland-Luttecke, 2014; Denis & Xu, 2013; Jha, 2013; Olsen &
Zaman, 2013; Sawicki & Shrestha, 2014). In the academic field research with respect to
this issue, the focus is on whether insider trades generate abnormal profits through
different patterns. It also deals with what the sources of such information advantages that
managers enjoy, the extent of such special information that they are privy to, and the
magnitude of profits that they enjoy because of their privileged position. Corporate
executive managers’ information about the corporation’s earnings quality is one huge
source of privileged information (Byun & Roland-Luttecke, 2014; Denis & Xu, 2013;
Jha, 2013; Olsen & Zaman, 2013; Sawicki & Shrestha, 2014). Through this research
study, I investigated whether managers’ access to such privileged information (i.e.,
earnings quality) leads to strategic insider trades which might influence earnings
manipulation, and thus lead to the generation of abnormal profits.
When considering the dynamics in corporate announcements with respect to
insider trading patterns and EM, Agrawal and Cooper (2015) asserted that it is important
to understand that stock information creates a lot of value. An issue that came up in the
lawsuit against the Enron executives was whether they traded corporate securities before
the accounting issues were revealed, as this had to do with timing of information to the
public. Understanding the underlying patterns and mechanisms of insider trading, the risk
within the market, as well as the behavior patterns of the return series of futures, is
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important (Agrawal & Cooper, 2015). Understanding this information leads to better
decision-making by many groups, including the decision-makers, stakeholders,
shareholders, producers, investors, traders, and policy makers. With respect to policy
makers, it is important to know and comprehend who the decision-makers are in the
respective industry, such as the governmental and nongovernmental agents, so that
management can tailor their decision making to benefit current and future investors with
accurate information.
Olsen and Zaman (2013) analyzed insider trading and motives for EM, noting that
recent studies in accounting and finance have focused on the extent to which managers
alter reported earnings for their own benefit. The researchers developed and tested three
possible hypotheses utilizing Jones’s 1991 model. Olsen and Zaman used this to explain
the motivations for EM that is associated with insider trading. These hypotheses are
opportunism, signaling, and smoothing. The researchers investigated the patterns of
insider trading associated with EM. Their findings showed that the buying trades of
insiders decrease in frequency relative to selling trades as earnings are managed upwards,
secondly, after they controlled for size, the trading patterns of insider still holds true and
finally, when partitioning the sample of past returns, the trading patterns is still present
within categories of past returns. They concluded that these results are consistent with
opportunism signaling that insiders will take advantage of the opportunity to engage in
the insider trading to influence earnings quality (Olsen & Zaman, 2013).
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Academic research in managerial trading and stock market profit has been in
place and investigated and examined as early as the first part of the past century. Smith
(1940) investigated this assertion and reported in his study that insiders engaged in the
selling of stocks before or after the stock price peaks but missed extreme highs, while
major purchases are followed by recessions and early stages of rising markets. Smith’s
research result indicated that managers may possess a non-random ability in the timing of
the stock price performance of their corporations. Jaffe (1974) was among the first
researchers that had an exhaustive conclusive large-sample studies that investigated to
see if insider trades benefits from abnormal returns. His research study concluded that
insiders do possess privileged information; other researchers support this finding
(Finnerty, 1976; Karpoff & Lee, 1991; Lambe, 2016; Odaiyappa & Nainar, 1992). Jaffe
also argued that trading on such privileged information is also widespread, suggesting
that insiders do violate securities regulations. The research study also indicated that after
the public availability of insider trading information, the market usually takes a gradual
as well as a prolonged time to react to the new information. This is a finding that is
inconsistent with the perception of the efficient market hypotheses.
As the years progressed, new regulations have been passed and that has increased
the restrictiveness of insider trades. However, Jaffe (1974) argued that the SEC is only
engaged in the prosecution of the most conspicuous cases of speculation based on private
information. He also argued that this is due to several factors. The first being that the
SEC has the burden of responsibility to prove that there is an abnormal generation of
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profits as well as to prove that there is the existence of material private and privileged
information. Second, he noted that as a matter of fact, there is still a heavy reliance on the
public and the media by the SEC in other for them to know where to start or begin their
searches. As this is the case, the probability that the SEC will successfully prosecute
executive managers for the possession of privileged information with respect to
discretionary portions of earnings seems to be a distant and unlikely possibility. He also
argued that the likelihood that the SEC will prosecute insiders because they are
strategically timing an earnings surprise to boost stock prices and then concurrently sell
their stock is also slim (Jaffe, 1974).
At the time of this study, the regulations have placed restrictions on insider
trading that provided incentives to executive managers to be able to game the market to
be able to increase profit that will be of benefit to them on a personal note. If these
restrictive regulations were not in place, executive managers will be able to freely profit
from the market because they have access to privileged information, because they will
have incentives to withhold privileged information, including information about accruals
(Jaffe, 1974). McGee and Block (2014) and Ronen (1977) argued that in an environment
that is regulated that seeks to restrict insider trades, there will be a restraint on behalf of
executive managers to disclose information that will improve the proper allocation of
information. In an alternative fashion, regulatory measures that restricts insider trades
will give executive managers the incentive to curb disclosures to include earnings quality
in such a manner that will make them privy to privileged information that they can trade
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upon. However, if insider trading regulations is missing, the executive manager will have
no personal incentives that will help limit the flow of information because in this
situation, his trading is not restricted (McGee & Block, 2014).
A large amount of research based on insider trading provides a series of results
that serve as a basis for this research study. These research studies can be generally
classified into two broad categories. The first one is based on the relationship between
insider trading patterns and the properties of EM, and second one is based on the
relationship between insider trading patterns, earnings news, as well as market
benchmarks. Included in the research studies that investigated the relationship that exist
between insider trading patterns and the properties of EM are the studies carried out by
Beneish and Vargus (2002), Blair (2016), Brisker et al. (2016), and Garcia et al. (2017).
They reported in their studies that corporations that have the tendency to exhibit
abnormal insider selling activities may have accruals that are less persistent, while
abnormal insider buying activities have an opposite effect. Their studies concluded that
such opportunistic EM will be successful in misleading the public as well as investors
because insider trading strategies that factors the magnitude of accruals and direction of
insider sales will generate abnormal profits ranging from 15% to 22%. Beneish and
Vargus indicated that insider trading by executive management is informative of the
earnings quality of the firm. They specifically argued that the relationship that exist
between current earnings and future earnings is more or less when it is accompanied by
insider buying or selling; their findings also showed that investors price all income-
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increasing accruals as if they are of high quality. Their research study also provided
evidence that the low persistence of earnings during periods of insider sales is partly
attributable to EM (Beneish & Vargus, 2002).
One of the requirement of the SEC is that when trading is done by insiders, it
should be reported to the SEC in the 10th day of the following month. However, not all
trading qualifies for 10th day reporting disclosures and those are the trades that need to
be reported in form 5. Brochet (2010), Cheng et al. (2007), and Chen et al. (2013) argued
that delayed insider trade disclosures through Form 5 filings give good information with
respect to future earnings, and that such trades can predict future bad news where
subsequent filings are met with significantly negative returns. Insider trading sales that
qualify for Form 5 filing disclosure are typically not required to be disclosed in the
following month. Rather, they are required to be disclosed at the end of the fiscal year;
this requirement has helped in providing a useful place that can be used to observe any
managerial trading behavior in the absence of mandatory disclosures regarding such
trades. Chen et al. provided proof that executive managers will seize the opportunity to
trade under Form 5 filings. This finding contrasts with Form 4 filings, as these filings are
more associated with future declines in firm performance. After the Form 5 sales are
disclosed at the end of the fiscal year, shareholders react negatively, which is an
indication that at most, some managers utilize Form 5 filings in the dispensing of shares
along with the anticipation of future declines in performance. These research findings are
of interest to this study because they that if managers can conceal their trading, their
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trading patterns have the propensity to generate abnormal profits. Thus, this would make
it possible for a manager to be able to have the ability to predict future declines in firms’
performance, and if this is allowed (for instance, using Form 5 filings), trading would be
able to generate profits at the expense of shareholders.
Insider Trading and Earnings Announcements
Other researchers investigated how managers use privileged information to their
benefits (Cheng et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2013; Chowdhury et al., 2017; Hugon & Lee
2016; Ke et al., 2003) use their studies to investigate managers’ ability to utilize
privileged information about future corporate earnings to their benefit. (Ke et al., 2003)
where the ones that noted that insiders are privy to inside information, and use that to
trade upon forthcoming bad earnings news. In their research study, they did an analysis
on the patterns of insider trading during quarters when there is a lapse in a string of
consecutive earnings increases. The analysis made on the firms that was investigated
indicated that insiders don’t trade in the one or two quarters preceding the break in
earnings. The assumption is that managers are doing this to maintain the appearance that
will show that insiders are not taking advantage of non-public privileged information.
However, they noted that there is a rise in the frequency of insider selling in the quarters
before that.
In a similar fashion but different direction, Piotroski and Roulstone (2004, 2005)
sampled different firms utilizing different methodology. Theirs studies also found similar
insider trading patterns where insiders traded upon forthcoming decreases in cash flow.
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These research studies indicate managers have access to privileged information about
future earnings of the corporations. With this type of ability to predict the performance of
the firm into the future, whether it is in future earnings or future cash flows, they have the
opportunity to time insider trading transactions in a strategic manner tilted in to their
benefit. Therefore, in this study, it was of pertinent interest to investigate if the privileged
information that is available to managers contains any value-relevant information about
the corporations’ discretionary accruals, as well as if insider trades are related to the
magnitude and incidence of such accruals. It would also be good to know if such insider
trades are predictive of future declines in corporate earnings.
Other researchers investigated the relationship between insider trading patterns,
and earnings news, a couple of important studies will serve as a basis for this dissertation
(Agrawal & Cooper, 2015; Beneish & Vargus 2002; Cziraki et al., 2016; McVay et al.,
2006; Richardson et al., 2004). These previous researchers noted that corporations walk
down forecasts to precede equity issuances and insider selling. The assumption was that
forecasts that are issued early in the forecast horizon are more optimistic than forecasts
that are issued closer to the announcement date. They also argued managers can perceive
that a positive earnings surprise is beneficial to them. This is the notion that even in a
market with complete information there should be no difference between guiding
forecasts downward or having a negative earnings surprise. Another argument that was
made is based on a test that was conducted with a sample of over 500 firms that have
been involved in accounting scandals with earnings-decreasing restatement and non-
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restating firms showed that managers who sell stock while earnings are misstated
potentially committed two crimes, earnings manipulation and insider trading (Agrawal &
Cooper, 2015). These studies are of importance because they indicate that managers
understand the importance of meeting or beating their earnings benchmarks on firm stock
price performance through insider trades. Even if meeting an earnings forecast includes
the lowering of market expectations, managers seem to prefer that outcome over missing
an earnings benchmark in periods where they plan to sell their stocks (Agrawal & Cooper
2015).
Still other researchers have carried out studies that finds that insider trading is not
associated with the magnitude of the earnings forecast errors. Researchers (Ali, 2017;
Dargenidou et al., 2017; Hirshleifer & Usman, 2016; Hugon & Lee, 2016; Milian, 2016;
Sivakumar & Waymire 1994) argued that their studies find insider trading transactions
are more focused in the direction of the unexpected earnings news. In all the studies
carried out, there is a consensus in their results which indicated that post-announcement
insider trades do generate abnormal returns. However, some of the studies did not
investigate the issue of earnings quality during periods of insider trades. Cheng and
Leung (2008), Choi (2017), and Sivakumar and Waymire (1994) were able to provide
documentation indicating a significant relationship between insider trading and one-twoand three-year ahead earnings changes as well as future analyst forecast revisions. Their
research findings suggested that if insider trades are tilted toward the direction of forecast
error, then it therefore means that insider trades are consistent with having private value-
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relevant information. However, if insider trades are tilted in the opposite direction to the
forecast error, the assumption is that insider trading will be benefit from security
mispricing. These studies are also of importance for this dissertation for a number of
reasons. First being that the studies confirm the importance of meeting or beating
earnings benchmark used as a measure of firm performance. Secondly, executive
managers will rather prefer to meet or beat an earnings benchmark while lowering a
corporation’s performance expectations whenever they plan to sell their stock, and
finally, based on the findings, the direction of earnings surprises is correlated with the
direction of insider trades.
The above research studies explored investigated some of the relationship that
exist between earnings news, earnings benchmarks, and insider trading patterns and
provided proof that managers are privy to privileged information regarding corporate
earnings news. These research studies also indicated that managers do have the capacity
to be able to predict future earnings. The findings also suggested that managers also
understand the importance of meeting or exceeding earnings benchmarks when they
decide to trade their shares. As some of the past research studies have been able to show
that a relationship exists between earnings benchmarks and insider trading patterns, this
study will attempt to investigate whether the extent to which managers beat the earnings
benchmark is related to their insider trading intensity, as well as whether managers are
actively manipulating earnings to exceed earnings benchmark so that they will be able to
sell their shares.
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Looking at the stream of research carried out in insider trading, this dissertation
study is related to other research studies regarding earnings quality issues and how they
are related to insider trading. First, Beneish et al. (2012), Cheng and Warfield (2005),
Dargenidou et al. (2017), and McVay et al. (2006) documented corporations whose
managers sell stock have an increased incidence of just meeting or exceeding the
consensus forecast. The researchers also noted in their studies that managers that have
plans to sell their security holdings are the most likely to meet or exceed the earnings
benchmark. Their research findings also indicated that managers are more likely to
manipulate their working capital accounts to achieve the benchmark. Second, prior
researchers (Cheng & Warfield, 2005; Cheng & Lo, 2006; Chowdhury et al., 2017;
Garcia et al., 2017; Sawicki & Shrestha, 2008, 2014) in their respective studies found a
link between executive compensation and future insider trading and they argued that this
link is arbitrated by earnings by EM. Their results also showed that managers with high
levels of stock compensation are more likely to record positive accruals, higher
incidences of meeting or exceeding earnings forecasts, and in turn will have an increased
level of subsequent insider trading. Third, prior researchers (Beneish & Vargus, 2002;
Beneish et al., 2004, 2012; Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; Dargenidou et al., 2017;
Garcia et al., 2017; Sawicki & Shrestha, 2008) have investigated the association between
EM and insider trading. Beneish et al. tested a sample of 462 firms that have experienced
technical default in the period 1983-1997 a period that preceded poor corporate
performance. Their findings are contrary to the other research studies mentioned above
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from a different perspective. They contend that the find no support for the pump and
dump hypotheses that earnings are being managed before managers sell their equity.
Their study also did not find a positive relationship between abnormal accruals and
insider trading activity. Among the sample of corporations tested, their findings also
showed that managers manage earnings upwards after periods of insider selling, this is an
observation that they attribute to managers’ incentives to minimize litigation, reputation,
and employment losses.
The prior researchers examined the broad issue of EM, earnings quality, and
insider trades. McVay et al. (2006) investigated the distributional properties of earnings.
These researchers did not use the Jones model (1991), McVay et al. did not investigate
the effects of EM on future performance, the researchers did not investigate the
relationship between the forecast error and magnitude of insider trading, and they did not
investigate the role of option compensation on such actions. Cheng and Warfield (2005)
did not examine the effects of EM on future performance, they did not investigate the
relationship between the forecast error and magnitude of insider trading, and they did not
investigate the role of option compensation and how it relates to earnings manipulation.
Beneish et al. (2004, 2012) investigated the problems of earnings quality and insider
trading using a special sample of corporations that have faced high litigation. With the
subsample tested, their findings did not indicate the presence of EM during periods of
insider trades. The findings of Beneish et al. are also in contrast with the findings of
Cheng and Warfield as well as McVay et al. However, the importance of these research
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studies lies in the premise that managers do have a clear understanding of the implication
of EM in high litigation industries. This was an indication that further investigation was
warranted in the issue of EM and insider trading.
Compensation Structure and Incentives
This study would not be complete without investigating the relationship that
exists among the structure of compensation for corporate executives, the performance of
the corporation with respect to EM and insider trading patterns. Specifically, I
investigated if stock option holdings by executives would influence an increased insider
selling by insiders based on the compensation structure of the firm and if there was a
managerial incentive associated to managing earnings upward. This part of the study
attempted to examine important research studies carried out in executive compensation
and the effects of its incentive on executive managers. The discussion of executive
compensation would not be complete without the issue of agency cost, separation, and
control. Jensen and Meckling (1976) were the first to investigate agency costs and
aligned it to the problem of separation and control in present day corporation. Since then,
more researchers have examined the association between executive compensation
structure as well as the incentives around it and the actions created as a result.
Early research studies regarding compensation structures were based on the
premise of if the current compensation structures are in uniformity with agency theory
forecast (Garen, 1994; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Garen (1994) argued that the literature
on executive compensation has failed to identify a method of executive compensation on
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which to base as well as test the hypotheses regarding it determinants. Rather, he
investigated the measure and structure of executive compensation utilizing a simple
principal-agent model to ascertain how well it can explain the variations in CEO
incentive pay and salaries. His research findings are consistent with past studies (e.g.,
Jensen & Murphy, 1990) that executive compensation is structured to trade off incentives
for insurance and that the pay-for performance sensitivity is too low. This contrasts with
forecast of the principal-agent theory. The research study also contends that statistical
importance for some of the effects are relatively weak, even though the magnitudes are
huge. Garen (1994) argued that there is very little proof of the use of relative performance
pay. However, the researcher contended that although a puzzling question still looms, the
principal-agent considerations still have a huge role in setting executive compensation.
With the amount of investigations conducted on firms’ compensation structure,
as well as the type of findings from such studies and the vagueness on the optimal
structure of executive compensation, this gave rise to more studies being conducted on
this topic. All in the name of trying to address the problems surrounding executive pay in
firms as it has become a problem that is also seen as associated to EM and insider trading.
Researchers (Devers & Sanders, 2016; Fich & White, 2003; Halioui et al., 2016; Hsieh et
al., 2016; Oyer & Schaefer, 2003; Pelger & Schäfer, 2017; Yermack, 2004) have
contended that there is no agreement in the literature that clearly defines what constitutes
an optimal compensation structure of an executive, regardless of the nature of the
compensation, which includes stock options, stock, restricted stock, cash, bonus, as well
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as where most corporations engages a mixture of the listed compensation in an ad hoc
basis.
Other research studies on compensation have also investigated the relationship
that exist between compensation structure and real actions taken by executives. Some of
these research studies have dedicated time to investigate if compensation is associated
with the amount of risk levels taken by executives that are on same page with shareholder
demands. This behavior of risk taking is noticed when there is consideration by
executives trying to merge with or acquire other corporations as contended by Burns et
al. (2017) and Datta et al. (2001). In the areas of expenditures related to research and
development, Cheng (2004) investigated to see if committee on compensation seek to
avert opportunistic decrease in research and development expenditure. Cheng’s
hypotheses contended that research and development funding are positively related with
changes in CEO compensation in two ways: when the CEO nears retirement and when
the corporation is faced with a decrease in earnings and losses.
Other researchers have investigated what determines the compensation structure
of corporations with respect to shareholder composition as well as the presence of
institutional investors (Almazan et al., 2005; Coleman, 2016; Jongjaroenkamol & Laux,
2017). They used a stylized model to investigate the effects of institutional monitoring on
executive compensation. The model utilized was able to predict that the level of
compensation is enhanced when there is influence on managers’ pay-for-performance
sensitivity when institutions have lower implied costs of monitoring. However, they
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argued that these effects are impaired when the firm-specific cost of monitoring is high.
Their findings are consistent with these implications, in a broad manner. Thus, suggesting
that independent investment advisors and investment company managers do have
advantages in monitoring firms' management when it comes to compensation.
Other researchers have investigated the association between executive
compensation structure and the patterns of information disclosure. One of the focus on
this research is based on disclosure of information around option awards (Aboody &
Kasznik, 2000). Aboody and Kasznik (2000) tested to determine whether corporations’
CEOs can manage the timing of their voluntary disclosures around stock option awards.
They speculated that executive CEOs can manage the expectations of investors’ around
award dates and they achieve this by delaying good news and instead put forth bad news.
The researchers sampled 572 corporations that have a fixed award schedules to look more
than 2,039 CEO options awards. The researchers were able to document the changes in
share prices as well as analyst earnings forecasts in the period of option awards that is
consistent with their speculation. They also provided a compelling evidence that is more
direct based on EM forecast that is issued before the award dates. Their results are of the
assumption that CEOs have the ability to make opportunistic disclosure decisions on a
voluntary basis that will maximize their stock option compensation (Aboody & Kasznik,
2000).
The manipulation of information around stock option re-pricing is another area
that was investigated by (Callaghan et al., 2016; Carter & Lynch, 2001; Nagar et al.,
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2003). They contend that share and options compensation are related to increased
voluntary disclosure by corporation to reduce agency issues. Their investigation included
a comparison of corporations that re-prices management’s stock options in 1998 to a
sample of controlled corporations with out-of-the-money options in 1998 that do not
engage in re-pricing. The results of their study showed that there is the likelihood of repricing increasing for young, high technology corporations and corporations whose stock
options are more out-of-the-money. Furthermore, Callaghan et al. (2016), Carter and
Lynch (2001), and Nagar et al. (2003) were able to provide evidence showing that
corporations’ will re-price to respond to poor firm-specific, and not poor industry
performance. However, the result of their testing could not provide any proof that repricing had any association that is related to agency problems. Additionally, they contend
that finding from their investigation is consistent with corporate re-pricing of stock
options that is used to restore incentive effects as well as to discourage executive
managers that are engaged in a competitive labor markets from going to work for other
corporations (Callaghan et al., 2016; Carter & Lynch, 2001; Nagar et al., 2003).
I also examined whether compensation structure through options award, buyback,
or backdating is influenced by insider trading, thus resulting in EM. Stock options have
been a standard form of compensation for the past three decades, and as time passes, it
has become one of the most popular means of compensation tool next to cash, bonus, and
shares. As it stands in modern day businesses, more than 50% of total compensation that
is given to most top executive management comes in the form of options. Employees of
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firms that are not high up in the executive ladder have also started getting compensated
with stocks because study shows that about 40% of all big U.S. corporations provides
stock options to more than 50% of their employees (Hall & Knox, 2002).
Since the last post-scandal years, a variety of researchers have investigated the
effects of option compensation and EM (Cheng & Warfield, 2002; Chen et al., 2017;
Geertsema et al., 2016; Jongjaroenkamol & Laux, 2017; Qi et al., 2014). These
researchers investigated if there is a link between future insider trading and executive
compensation. They made a compelling assertion that future insider trading is effectuated
by EM. Their studies provided evidence that corporate managers that have an increased
level of stock compensation are more likely to document positive accruals, higher
occurrences of meeting or surpassing forecasts, and in return have an increased level of
subsequent insider trading. The nature of their assertion is an easy and very
straightforward; because it shows that the higher the equity compensation of the
executive, the more likely the executive is to manage earnings, and thus the higher the
vastness of insider sales. Additionally, the proof providing that association between EM
and stock compensation is quite fascinating because the intended purpose of stock
compensation was to situate the motivation of managers with those of shareholders.
However, Cheng and Warfield (2002); Chen et al. (2017); Geertsema, Lont et al. (2016);
and Jongjaroenkamol and Laux (2017) indicated that executives with increased level of
stock or option holdings are more likely to engage in the manipulation of corporate
earnings in their interest to increase their personal wealth at the detriment of shareholders
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of record. This is in stark contrast to the intended reason the incentives of stock
compensation were introduced in the first place.
The prior research findings are of interest to this study because there is an
indication that executives engage in EM when they see that they are close to the market
standard, as this will make it possible for executives to meet or beat the market by slight
manipulation of earnings. These research findings are also relevant to the research study
because they investigated the association between EM, and subsequent insider trading
patterns. If EM is a tool that is used in corporation to meet industry standard and
performance, and thus increase executive earnings, then it will be of interest to examine
whether engaging in insider trading based on information at the disposal of executive
prompts executives to trade their holding to benefit themselves when stock prices
appreciates.
Summary and Conclusions
In conclusion, in this chapter I included a variety of avenues related to this
research that call for further investigation. First, it is evident from the literature that
corporations engage in EM using either AEM, REM or classification shifting. These
methods of earning are not illegal and are not prohibited by GAAP. It is also evident
from the literature that corporations engage in insider trading to either meet or beat
market standards to experience higher stock returns for the current and following periods
either in the interest of the firm or their personal interest. For this reason, in the present
study I investigated whether there is an association between EM and insider trading. The
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literature shows that managers engage in the use of REM and classification shifting to
manage earnings instead of AEM that is recommended by GAAP since the enactment of
the SOX act. Finally, since there is evidence to show that the bigger the equity
compensation, the more likely is the incidence of earnings manipulations or fraud, I also
investigated whether executive managers enrich themselves through insider trading after
earnings manipulation decisions. Earnings management is a large portion of the existing
accounting literature (Sawicki & Shrestha, 2014). Sawicki and Shrestha (2014) argued
that a limited number of researchers have analyzed the incentives associated with EM
when it comes to insider trading patterns and the motives driving them. This dissertation
study was intended to fill this gap in the literature.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
Evidence from SEC investigations and other regulators show that corporate
scandals linked to insider trading and EM have become more prevalent than in previous
years, leading to a record number of corporate bankruptcies, indictments, and prison
sentences (Beasley et al., 1999; Rezaee, 2005; Tillman, 2009). The purpose of this
quantitative, non-experimental correlational study was to examine whether there is an
association between insider trading patterns and EM citations for a randomly selected
sample of publicly traded companies. In this chapter, I explain the methodology used to
evaluate the association between insider trading patterns and EM citations. First, I
introduce the research design and rationale. Next, I describe the population, sampling,
and sampling procedures. I then present the procedures for recruitment, participation, and
data collection. I also present the instrumentation, operationalization of constructs, and a
data analysis plan. Finally, I discuss threats to validity as well as ethical procedures.
Research Design and Rationale
In this study, I examined the relationship between the continuous dependent
variable of number of EM citations and the dichotomous independent variable of insider
trading using a quantitative methodology and a non-experimental, correlational design.
Through quantitative approaches, researchers use numerically measurable variables to
make statistical inferences about a population or a relationship (Field, 2013). This was an
appropriate approach, as I sought to use archival, measurable data rather than an in-depth
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qualitative interview process. Because I used archival data, I could not experimentally
manipulate any variables. As such, the non-experimental, correlational design was most
appropriate (Field, 2013). Additionally, various authors and researchers (Agrawal &
Cooper, 2015, 2017; Ahearne, Boichuk, Chapman, & Steenburgh, 2016; Alldredge &
Cicero, 2015; Chowdhury, Mollah, & Al Farooque, 2017; Degiannakis, Giannopoulos,
Ibrahim, & Rozic, 2017; Olsen & Zaman, 2013; Sawicki & Shrestha, 2014) have used a
non-experimental, correlational design to study EM and insider trading in varying
capacities. As such, my research design was consistent with past research design in this
field needed to advance knowledge in EM and insider trading literature.
The qualitative or mixed methods designs would not have been appropriate for
this study. A qualitative study would not have allowed for statistically verifiable
hypotheses testing. Additionally, due to the sensitive nature of the topic, it is unlikely
potential participants would feel comfortable participating in a qualitative study; those
with knowledge of higher-level corporate operations would likely be unavailable or
unwilling to be interviewed. As I focused on the use of archival data, no resource
constraints existed.
With this correlational, non-experimental design, I examined data within the
period beginning with January 1, 2002 and ending with December 31, 2012 for randomly
selected firms that are listed on the New York stock exchange to see if there was an
association between EM and insider trading. After the accounting scandal of 2002 that
led to the passage of the SOX Act, research (e.g., Siegel, Franz, & O’Shaughnessy, 2010)

80
centered on time periods pre-SOX Act and leading up to 2002, when the law was passed.
However, even with the SOX Act in place, firms engage in insider trades or EM using the
same method, through classification shifting, or changing their method of managing their
earnings (Agrawal & Cooper, 2015; Chen, Lee, & Chou, 2015; Olsen & Zaman, 2013;
Sawicki & Shrestha, 2014).
I used publicly available archival data. There are numerous benefits associated
with using available archival data. It is readily available, numerous, may be used in a
variety of research contexts, requires less resource expenditure, and may be used to
analyze historical trends rather than current trends (Church, 2002; Punch, 2013;
Singleton, Straits, & Straits, 1993).
Methodology
In this section, I describe the procedures that were used to carry out the study. I
present the population, sampling, and sampling procedures first. Next, I present the
procedures for recruitment, participation, and data collection. I describe the
instrumentation and operationalize the variables, and then I present the data analysis plan.
Population
The population for this research study comprised publicly traded firms that are
registered on the NYSE and filed their financial reports with the SEC between January 1,
2002 and December 31, 2012. I examined all earnings and insider trading transactions
reported by the 77 firms that were randomly selected in the U.S. SEC website, litigation
releases, administrative proceedings, and the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
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section of the SEC document archives with data covering a 10-year period from January
1, 2002, to December 31, 2012 to see whether there was a relationship between insider
trading and earnings manipulation controlling for firm size. I examined proxy statements
as well as all insider transactions for all the firms for the period covered.
Sampling and Sampling Procedures
Simple random sampling was used to select a sample. In simple random sampling,
individuals (in this case, corporations) have an equal chance of being randomly selected
from the population (Acharya, Prakash, Saxena, & Nigam, 2013). This type of sampling
is beneficial, as it removes potential sources of bias, thus improving the validity of the
study (Acharya et al., 2013). I drew the sample by first collecting a listing of corporation
names active during January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2012 in an Excel spreadsheet. I
then used a random number generating website to randomly generate a series of numbers.
I used the randomly generated numbers to select the sample from the Excel spreadsheet. I
collected information involving income, balance sheets, statements of cash flows,
statements of retained earnings, and reports related to EM and insider trading from the
publicly available Edgar database of the SEC, Yahoo Finance, and S&P 500.
I collected relevant information from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2012.
Although research (Siegel et al., 2010) has been centered on times pre-SOX Act and
leading up to 2002 when the law was passed, little research has been done on the time
after the SOX act. The sampling frame involved firms that were publicly traded and the
range significantly in size. The sample only included firms that were required to report
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their earnings to the SEC. No privately controlled or non-corporate firms were included
in the study.
Sample size. I used G*Power to compute a sample size for the proposed multiple
linear regression (see Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2008). Cohen (1986)
recommended that a medium effect size, a power of .80, and an alpha of .05 be used in
power analyses. For a linear regression with these parameters and three predictors, a
sample of 77 companies was required (Faul et al., 2008).
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
I collected archival data from publicly available information found in the online
Edgar database of the SEC, Yahoo Finance website, S&P 500 website, and online
Morningstar database. I gathered financial statements (balance sheets, income statements,
and cash flow statements) of corporations from the original filings of Forms 10-Q, 10-K,
10-K405, and 10KSB from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2012. I also looked at the
corporate governance factors to collect demographic data such as the percentage of
insiders that are seated on the board of the firm, size of the firm, percentage of female
executives as opposed to male executive, industry that the firms are in and the sector of
the business. This information was publicly available, so I did not need permission to
access the information.
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs
As I used publicly available archival data, I did not use a classic research
instrumentation. Instead, I collected the financial statements (income statements,
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statement of earnings, balance sheets, and statement of cash flow) the original filings of
forms 10-K, 10-K405, and 10-KSB. I collected these from the annual financial statements
in the Edgar database of the SEC. I pulled information on the corporate governance
factors from the sample of firms. I looked at the percentage of insiders on the board of
directors. I collected data for the sample corporations from the Morningstar database. I
pulled information from the proxy statements on form DEF 14A from the previously
listed websites. I collected data of firms with no EM citation from the Yahoo database. I
also collected data from the finance page of the S&P 500 website. For instance, I
collected data from proxy statements on form DEF 14A from the listed websites to look
at the corporate governance factors such as the percentage of insiders on the board of
directors.
The SEC act of 1934 requires all corporations that are publicly listed to issue
annual reports after the performance of an external public audit, including internal control
procedures. This helps to ensure that the information that is released to the public is
accurate and reliable to users. Morning Star, S&P and Yahoo Finance are well known and
recognized industry leaders that are registered with the United States and accepted by
businesses for storage of complete financial information.
Operationalization of constructs. I randomly sampled selected firms and
analyze their associated data using established metrics that have been identified through
prior research as indicators of EM, insider trading, and fraudulent financial reporting. The
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objective of this study was to see what relationship existed between insider trading
pattern and number of EM citations.
Number of earnings management citations. This was a continuous dependent
variable measuring the number of EM citations a company had received between January
1, 2002 and December 31, 2012. I measured it continuously, meaning that the exact
number of citations, starting from 0, was recorded.
Patterns of insider trading. This was a categorical independent variable
measuring the patterns used to manage earnings. I measured it using stocks option
sales/purchase, accounts receivables, inventory, total sales, compensation structure, total
assets, stock compensation, stock options buyback. The categories were coded as 0 = no
insider trading, 1 = insider trading present.
Insiders on board. This was a continuous demographic variable measuring how
many insiders were seated on the board of the firm, measured as a percentage of outside
board members.
Firm size. This was a categorical demographic variable measuring the size of the
firm. It was categorized into small, medium, and large corporations.
Percentage of female executives. This was a continuous demographic variable
measuring the percentage of female executives as opposed to male executives.
Industry. This was a categorical demographic variable measuring the type of
industry the firm is in. Categories consisted of investment, real estate, retail firms, oil
firms, hedge funds firms, and insurance firms.
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Data Analysis Plan
I used a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to organize the data. I then imported the data
into IBM’s SPSS for analysis. I calculated descriptive statistics to describe the sample. I
calculated frequencies, percentages, means, and standard deviations as appropriate.
To answer the research question of what association exists between number of
earnings management citations and patterns of insider trading in publicly trading firms,
controlling for firm size, I conducted a multiple linear regression. This is the appropriate
analysis to perform when seeking to assess the relationship between a set of continuous
or categorical independent variables or covariates and a continuous dependent variable
(Field, 2013). The dependent variable for this analysis was number of EM citations. The
independent variable was patterns of insider trading, coded as 0 = no insider trading, 1 =
insider trading present. I added the categorical variable of firm size as a covariate,
dummy coded into medium and large, with small as the reference category.
I tested the assumptions of the multiple linear regression first. These included
normality, homoscedasticity, and absence of multicollinearity. I assessed normality using
a normal P-P plot. If the data points followed the diagonal normality line without extreme
deviation, the assumption of normality was met (Field, 2013). I assessed
homoscedasticity using a scatterplot of the residuals. If the data were generally equally
distributed with no cone-shaped pattern, the assumption of homoscedasticity was met
(see Field, 2013). I assessed absence of multicollinearity through variance inflation factor
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(VIF) values. VIF values below 10 indicated that the assumption was met (see Stevens,
2009).
I evaluated the F test at the p = .05 level to determine the significance of the
overall model (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). I interpreted the R2 value as the proportion of
variance explained by the regression (Field, 2013). If the overall model was significant, I
would assess the individual predictors for that variable to determine what individual
predictors significantly predict variability in the dependent variable. If the individual
predictor of EM citations was significant at the p = .05 level, then the null hypotheses
was rejected.
Threats to Validity
The validity of this research supports the trustworthiness of my statistical
arguments. I considered external, internal, and construct validity. The concept of external
validity is the extent to which the results of a study are generalizable to the wider
population sampled from (Dross, 2011). Threats to external validity are attributable to
generalizing to different or inappropriate populations (Dross, 2011). As such, I made no
generalizations beyond the study population.
Internal validity refers to how well causal conclusions from the analyses are
made, based on the experimental design (Drost, 2011). I used a non-experimental design
in this research, meaning that there was no causal relationship assumed. As such, threats
to internal validity, such as maturation or mortality, were not applicable.
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Construct validity refers to how appropriately a construct was operationalized
(i.e., does it measure what it says it measures; Drost, 2011). In this study, construct
validity was aided by the fact that other researchers have used the same instrument to
investigate similar or the same type of questions or reactions within other business
sectors that are related to this study (e.g., Alldredge & Cicero, 2015; Chen,Y-C., Lee, &
Chou, 2015).
Ethical Procedures
Prior to any data collection or other procedures, I gained Walden Institutional
Review Board (IRB) approval 04-26-18-0148650. I collected the data for this research
study from publicly available financial reports submitted to the SEC. Thus, no human
participants were involved in this research study. Additionally, no institutional
permissions were necessary. I did not collect any individual’s information, nor did I
release or associate company names with results. I do not foresee any ethical concerns
associated with the research process due to the archival nature of the study. I saved all
data on a password-protected computer. After 5 years, I will securely wipe the data from
the computer.
Summary
I employed a quantitative, non-experimental, correlational research design. I
examined randomly selected corporations listed in the NYSE that are required to file a
SEC report on a yearly basis between January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2012. I collected
data from the 10K, Proxy statements, and cash flow statements of public corporations
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that are located in the SEC.gov, Morningstar.com, Yahoo finance and Edgar online
databases. I used a multiple linear regression to see if there was an association between
corporations’ insider trading patterns and EM citations from 2002-2012. In Chapter 4, I
detail the results of the analyses described in this chapter. In Chapter 5, I discuss the
results.
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Chapter 4: Results
There is a widespread problem of corporate accounting fraud increasingly
manifesting as EM (Lin & Wu, 2015). Corporate scandals have brought down leading
firms like Enron, HealthSouth, Tyco, and WorldCom, and have resulted in decreased
trust amongst investors. Financial misconduct such as this is associated with large stock
price decline, SEC inquiry, top executive change or turnover, insider trading, and
bankruptcy filings (Agrawal & Cooper, 2015). As such, corporate financial-reporting
practices have been put under scrutiny.
This study addressed the problem that association between insider trading patterns
and EM citations among publicly traded companies was not well understood. Agarwal
and Singh (2006) suggested the likelihood of a connection between insider trading and
EM when it comes to the dissemination of asymmetric information. Accordingly, the
purpose of this quantitative, non-experimental study was to examine the association, if
any, between insider trading patterns and EM citations for a randomly selected sample of
publicly traded companies.
Through this quantitative research study, I examined insider trading patterns and
EM citations after the SOX Act of 2002 until 2012. The theoretical framework for this
study was based on the accounting and auditing theories of Arens et al. (2014), Glover et
al. (2014), Fruhan (1979), and Haugen (2001), as well as financial theories of portfolio
performance. The research question and hypotheses were as follows:
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Research Question: What association exists between number of earnings
management citations and patterns of insider trading in publicly trading firms, controlling
for firm size?
H0: There is no significant association between number of earnings management
citations and patterns of insider trading in the publicly trading firms after controlling for
firm size.
Ha: There is a significant association between number of earnings management
citations and patterns of insider trading in the publicly traded firms after controlling for
firm size.
In this chapter, I present the results of the procedures and analysis described in
Chapter 3. First, I describe the data collection process. Then, I report the descriptive
statistics. Next, I report the results of the hypotheses testing. I conclude the chapter with a
summary.
Data Collection
I collected data covering January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2012 from a series of
publicly available financial sources. I started by using ABI/Inform Global that is
available through the Walden University library and Google scholar to access any articles
and peer-reviewed journals related to EM and insider trading during the 11-year window
under consideration. I examined each 8K, 10Q, 10K, DEF 14A, proxy statement, as well
as insider transaction for each of the 77 firms that were randomly selected to determine
whether a significant relationship existed between insider trading patterns and EM after
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controlling for firm size. I then pulled the litigation releases for all 77 firms to determine
if all citations were due to insider trading or not due to insider trading. I then uploaded
the data to SPSS for management and analysis. As I accessed and used archival data,
there are no recruitment or response rates to report.
I sampled a total of 77 firms out of 400 possible firms based on a G*Power
calculation (see Faul et al., 2014). Nine of these firms were foreign firms that trade on the
NYSE and make reports to the NYSE. I excluded those from the sample and sampled an
additional nine firms that were not foreign. This resulted in a total sample of 77 firms. I
compiled the archival data in an Excel spreadsheet and then uploaded it into SPSS.
Data Management
I assessed the data for missing cases, and there were no cases with missing data. I
then checked the continuous number of EM citations variable for outliers using
Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2013) process, which involves calculating standardized values
(Z scores) associated with the continuous variable of interest and then visually examining
the standardized values for high or low values. Standardized scores less than -3.29 or
greater than 3.29 are considered outlying values (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). After
examining the standardized scores associated with EM citations, there were no scores that
qualified as an outlier. Thus, I retained the full sample of 77 firms.
Descriptive Statistics
After assessing the data, I calculated descriptive statistics to describe the sample
of firms. Descriptive statistics include frequencies and percentages for categorical

92
variables and means and standard deviations for continuous variables. The majority of
firms sampled had patterns of insider trading present (58.44%). Most firms were large or
medium (58.44%). The firms represented a large range of industries, but the largest
groupings were in consumer services (12.99%), finance (11.69%), and investment
(10.39%). The firms had an average of 1.39 (SD = 1.18) EM citations. The average
percentage of insiders on the board was 46.62% (SD = 14.38%). The average percent of
female executives in the firm was 9.96% (SD = 10.04%). I present the full frequencies
and percentages in Table 1.
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Table 1
Frequencies and Percentages of Company Characteristics
Characteristic
Patterns of Insider Trading
Not Present
Present
Firm Size
Large
Medium
Small
Industry
Banking
Broadcasting
Business Services
Capital Goods
Capital Management
Communications
Construction
Consumer Services
Cosmetics
Energy
Engineering
Finance
Gold
Health Care
Insurance
Investment
Manufacturing
Newspapers/Magazines
Oil and Gas
Pharmaceuticals
Real estate
Technology
Transportation

n

%

32
45

41.56
58.44

22
23
32

28.57
29.87
41.56

2
1
1
7
2
1
1
10
1
2
1
9
1
6
2
8
2
1
4
3
5
6
1

2.60
1.30
1.30
9.09
2.60
1.30
1.30
12.99
1.30
2.60
1.30
11.69
1.30
7.79
2.60
10.39
2.60
1.30
5.19
3.90
6.49
7.79
1.30
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Based on firm size, large firms had the most citations on average, although the
average number of citations was similar for each size (as shown in Figure 1).

Figure 1. Bar chart of average number of citations by firm size.
Those with patterns of insider trading present had more citations on average than
firms that did not, although citations were still present for firms that did not have patterns
of insider trading (as shown in Figure 2). Firms in the newspaper and magazine industry
had the highest average citations, followed by firms in the pharmaceuticals industry (as
shown in Figure 3). Firms in the business services, construction, cosmetics, gold,
manufacturing, and transportation industries had the lowest average citations (as also
shown in Figure 3).
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Figure 2. Bar chart of average number of citations by patterns of insider trading.

Figure 3. Bar chart of average number of citations by industry.
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Medium and large firms had the higher average percentage of female executives
than small size firms (as shown in Figure 4). I conducted a one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) to determine whether these differences were statistically significant. The data
met the assumption of equality of variances (Levene’s test p = .966; see Stevens, 2009) as
well as normality (skew and kurtosis levels less than the absolute value of 2.00 and 3.00,
respectively; Westfall & Henning, 2013). The ANOVA was significant, F(2, 74) = 7.70,
p = .001, η2 = .17, indicating that there was a significant difference in percentage of
female executives based on firm size. Table 2 presents the full results of this ANOVA.
Post hoc testing using Tukey’s correction indicated that this difference only existed
between small and large firm sizes (mean difference = 10.00%, p = .001). There was no
significant difference between small and medium firms, nor between medium and large
firms. Table 3 presents the full results of post hoc testing.

Figure 4. Bar chart of average percentage of female executives by firm size.
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Table 2
ANOVA Table for % of Female Executives by Firm Size
Source
Firm Size
Error
Total

SS
1320.18
6342.26
7662.44

df
2
74
76

MS
660.09
85.71

F
7.70

p
.001

η2
.17

Table 3
Tukey’s Post Hoc Tests for % of Female Executives by Firm Size
Firm Size (I) Firm Size (J)
Small
Medium
Large

Medium
Large
Small
Large
Small
Medium

Mean Difference (I-J)

SE

p

-5.11
-10.00
5.11
-4.89
10.00
4.89

2.53
2.56
2.53
2.76
2.56
2.76

.115
.001
.115
.186
.001
.186

Small firms had the lowest average percentage of insiders on the board, while
large and medium firms had the higher average percentage of insiders on the board (as
shown in Figure 5). I conducted a one-way ANOVA to determine whether these
differences were statistically significant. The data met the assumption of equality of
variances (Levene’s test p = .446; see Stevens, 2009). All data met the criteria for
normality based on skew and kurtosis levels except for the small level of firm size
(Westfall & Henning, 2013). However, the F test used in the ANOVA is robust to
violations of normality (Stevens, 2009). The ANOVA was not significant, F(2, 74) =
0.62, p = .539, η2 = .02, indicating that there was not a significant difference in
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percentage of insiders based on firm size. Table 4 presents the full results of this
ANOVA.

Figure 5. Bar chart of average percentage of insiders on board by firm size.
Table 4
ANOVA Table for % of Insiders on Board by Firm Size
Source
SS
df
MS
F
p
η2
Firm Size 260.592a
2.00
130.30
0.62
.539
0.02
Error
15452.65
74.00
208.82
Total
15713.24
76.00
To justify the inclusion of firm size as a covariate in the regression model, I ran a
series of point-biserial correlations between the dummy coded variables of medium and
large firm sizes and the number of EM citations. There was a significant relationship
between the large category of firm size and number of EM citations (r = .38, p = .001),
which justifies the inclusion of firm size as a covariate.
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Results
To answer the research question, I conducted a multiple linear regression with a
dependent variable of number of EM citations. This is the appropriate analysis to conduct
when the research aim is to determine the relationship between at least two continuous or
categorical predictor variables and a single continuous dependent variable (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2013). The categorical predictor variable of interest was patterns of insider
trading, coded as 1 = present and 0 = not present. The categorical covariate was firm size.
As this was a categorical variable with more than two categories, dummy coding was
necessary (Field, 2013). Dummy coding involves creating additional binary variables for
each category of the categorical variable, where the second category of each new variable
is considered the reference category (Field, 2013). I dummy coded firm size into two
variables: large and medium, with small as the reference category. This means that each
firm size variable (large and medium) was interpreted in terms of their relationship to the
dependent variable, as compared to the reference category of small firms.
Prior to interpreting the results of the regression, I assessed the assumptions of
normality, homoscedasticity, and absence of multicollinearity. The assumption of
normality is that the residuals of the regression are approximately normally distributed,
meaning that the data generally follow the ideal normal bell curve (Field, 2013). When
normality cannot be assumed, the statistical power of the analysis may be reduced and
estimates may not be reliable (Stevens, 2009). The assumption of homoscedasticity is that
the residuals of the regression have approximately equal variance (Field, 2013). If this
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assumption cannot be assumed, estimates may become biased (Stevens, 2009). The
assumption of absence of multicollinearity is that the predictor variables are not too
strongly related to one another (Field, 2013). When multicollinearity is present, the
statistical model is not able to accurately make predictions (Stevens, 2009).
I assessed normality using a P-P scatterplot of normality. If the points generally
follow the normality line, the assumption is met (Stevens, 2009). I present the P-P
scatterplot of normality in Figure 6. Although the scatterplot shows some step-like
patterning indicative of discrete (i.e., categorical) variables (Stevens, 2009), the data does
not deviate strongly from the normality line. I assumed normality.

Figure 6. Q-Q scatterplot testing normality.
I evaluated homoscedasticity using a scatterplot of the residuals. The assumption
is met if the points appear randomly distributed with no curvature. I present this
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scatterplot in Figure 7. The data points are in two groups, indicative of discrete
patterning, but do not show any signs of curvature, indicating that the assumption is met.

Figure 7. Residuals scatterplot testing homoscedasticity/
I then assessed absence of multicollinearity using VIF values. VIFs should ideally
be below 5.00 to indicate absence of multicollinearity (Stevens, 2009). All predictors in
the regression model have VIFs less than 5.00. The VIF for patterns of insider trading
was 1.12, for medium firm size 1.23, and for large firm size 1.27.
To interpret the results of the linear regression, I first examined the overall
regression model (i.e., the linear combination of the predictor variables; Field, 2013)
using the F test. Then, I examined the significance of the individual predictors (i.e., the
estimate of the individual predictor, holding the other variables constant; Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2013). For significant individual predictors, I examined the strength and direction
of that relationship using the unstandardized beta coefficient (B).
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The results of the overall linear regression model were significant, F(3,73) =
32.33, p < .001, R2 = 0.57. This indicated that approximately 57% of the variance in
number of EM citations was explained by patterns of insider trading and firm size. As
such, I examined the individual predictors. The large category of firm size was
significantly related to number of EM citations, B = 0.57, p = .013. This indicated that, on
average, a large firm would have 0.57 units more citations than a small firm, according to
the unstandardized beta coefficient. Medium sized firms do not predict a change in
citations when compared with small firms. Patterns of insider trading was significantly
associated with number of EM citations, B = 1.65, p < .001. This suggests that firms with
patterns of insider trading would have, on average, 1.65 units more citations than firms
without patterns of insider trading, as interpreted from the unstandardized beta
coefficient. Accordingly, I rejected the null hypothesis. I present the full results of this
regression model in Table 5.
Table 5
Results for Linear Regression with Patterns of Insider Trading and Firm Size
Variable
(Intercept)
Patterns of Insider Trading
(reference: not present)
Present
Firm Size (reference: small)
Medium
Large

B
0.16

SE
0.18

β
0.00

t
0.92

p
.360

95% CI
[-0.19, 0.52]

1.65

0.19

0.69

8.53

< .001

[1.27, 2.04]

0.32
0.57

0.22
0.22

0.12
0.22

1.46
2.56

.148
.013

[-0.12, 0.76]
[0.13, 1.02]
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Summary
I sampled 77 firms that met the inclusion criteria from archival data dating from
January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2012. I collected data from a series of publicly available
financial reports. There were no firms with missing data or outlying values. Most firms
were medium and large. Over half of the sample had patterns of insider trading present.
The results of hypothesis testing indicated that the null hypothesis could be rejected, as
there was a significant association between patterns of insider trading and number of EM
citations. Firms with patterns of insider trading were predicted to have more citations
than those without patterns of insider trading. There was also a significant association
between firm size and number of EM citations. Large firms were predicted to have more
citations than small firms; there was no change predicted from medium firms. I discuss
these results within the context of the relevant literature in Chapter 5. I also discuss the
strengths and limitations of the study. Finally, I give recommendations for future
research.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The purpose of this quantitative, non-experimental study was to examine the
association between insider trading patterns and EM citations for a randomly selected
sample of publicly traded companies. I analyzed insider trading patterns and EM through
AEM and REM with year-end financial reports, stock options, proxies, and other filings
of selected companies. I used these data sources to determine what association exists
between insider trading patterns and EM citation between 2002 and 2012.
Through this quantitative research study, I examined insider trading patterns and
EM citations after the SOX Act of 2002 during a 10-year period from January 1, 2002 to
December 31, 2012. The categorical independent variable was insider trading patterns.
The continuous dependent variable was number of EM citations. I included firm size as a
covariate. I focused on a sample of 77 firms that were randomly selected from publicly
trading companies listed in the NYSE, and used archival data from the SEC, Compustat,
Institutional Brokers Estimates System, CDA Spectrum database, Execucomp database,
and the NYSE. I sought to determine whether there was a relationship between EM and
insider trading patterns controlling for the size of the firm. The results of my testing
showed that there is a significant relationship between EM and insider trading.
Interpretation of the Findings
There is a widespread problem of corporate accounting fraud increasingly
manifesting as EM (Lin & Wu, 2015). Corporate scandals such as this have brought
down leading firms like Enron, HealthSouth, Tyco, and WorldCom, resulting in
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decreased trust amongst investors. Financial misconduct is often associated with large
stock price decline, SEC inquiry, top executive change or turnover, insider trading, and
bankruptcy filings (Agrawal & Cooper, 2015). As such, corporate financial-reporting
practices have been put under scrutiny (Chan et al., 2012; Nwogugu, 2015).
Through this quantitative research study, I examined insider trading patterns and
EM citations after the SOX Act of 2002 until 2012. I also attempted to expand the
comprehension of the importance of EM and insider trading patterns; though some
researchers have argued that it is impossible to outdo the market because all information
is available to all (Yusoff et al., 2015), many researchers have refuted this claim (e.g.,
Chan et al., 2012), which the findings of this study support. The findings indicated that
there is an association between number of EM citation and patterns of insider trading in
the publicly traded firms after controlling for firm size. Firms with patterns of insider
trading were predicted to have more citations than those without patterns of insider
trading.
The theoretical framework for this study was based on the accounting, finance,
and auditing theories of Arens et al. (2014), Glover et al. (2014), Fruhan (1979), and
Haugen (2001) as well as financial theories of portfolio performance. These theories
address the nature of EM, corporate finance, risks and returns investments, cost of
capital, auditing, and assurance services with respect to firms’ managements of their
earnings through investments, and fees charged during audits engagements (deHaan et
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al., 2015). These theories also address the nature of how investors value investment
portfolios as well as the governance needed to sustain the firm (Dittmar & Field, 2015).
I built my study on past research studies that have been conducted to investigate
what used to be common practice before the enactment of the SOX Act in 2002 (Hossain
et al., 2011). After the law was passed in Congress, it changed the way companies did
business and affected managing the firm’s earnings. I also built on past research on
corporate fraud and its effects on firms’ post-SOX Act (2000-2012) in publicly trading
companies to see if there was an effect on prevention of insider trading to boost EM.
Through my study, I was able to discover more information on EM, insider trading,
corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, audit fees, auditor independence,
financial reporting, and how the public as well as investors value the information that
they receive. Additionally, by focusing on 2002 to 2012, my study was aligned with
preexisting literature on facets of insider trading, market manipulation, and general
operating practices of publicly-traded firms after the passing of the SOX Act (DeHaan et
al., 2015; Dittmar & Field, 2015). As such, credibility is lent to the current study’s focus
on the time that was chosen.
In addition to the theories used in the study, in corporate finance, the pecking
order theory is used to postulate that the cost of financing increases with asymmetric
information when financing comes from three different sources: internal funds, debts, and
new equity. Donaldson (1961) first introduced the pecking order theory, which was later
modified by Myers and Majluf (1984). The theory helps describe how companies give
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priority to their source of financing by starting internally before using equity to finance
projects (Lemmon & Zender, 2016). Pecking order theory starts with asymmetric
information due to managers knowing more about the prospects of their companies
(Donaldson, 1961). Asymmetric information favors the issue of debt over equity. Debt
signals the board’s confidence that an investment is profitable and that the current stock
price is undervalued. The issue of equity signals a lack of confidence in the board and
constitutes that the share price is over-valued, leading to a decrease in share price. This
was related to my research as it centered on how information has been processed and how
the information is delivered to the outside investor. With corporation managers or
executives having firsthand information, they can say this information can, and should
be, delivered (Lemmon & Zender, 2016). My study demonstrated that managers took
advantage of information that was within the firm before disclosing to investors, thereby
allowing them to engage in insider trading that leads to EM citations
Furthermore, I attempted to show that insider trading patterns led to earnings
manipulation where it is hinged on maximizing profitability at the detriment of the firm.
This can be linked with behavioralist practices in financial theory, wherein individuals,
when faced with certain circumstances, will attempt to maximize any opportunity out
there and seek the greatest profit possible either for their own personal gain or for the
increased value of the firm (Agrawal & Cooper 2015). Although behavioral theories were
not at the focus of the current study, they may provide some insight as to why insider
trading patterns and EM have occurred within publicly-traded firms. Regardless,
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behavioral theory applies to the profit maximization sought by corporate insiders who
engage in insider trading. It would also be appropriate to assume that the behavioral
theory would, at a bare minimum, modify the desires of corporate insiders. Stakeholders
in publicly traded firms seek optimal maximization of profit that will increase the firm
value by putting out correct and reliable information for everyone to see and use at the
same time and make well-informed decisions.
Limitations of the Study
All research studies are not the same, so there is always the chance that there are
some limitations regarding the process of any study. I encountered some limitations to the
study, the first of which pertained to both the limited resources and literature on insider
trading. Many peer-reviewed journals and articles have dated information regarding
insider trading when compared to current research regarding EM. As such, the limited
amount of literature prolonged the timing of this research. EM and insider trading are
closely related, which affects firms in many ways. Furthermore, both EM and insider
trading may influence decision-making and may potentially reflect negatively on the
firm.
Another limitation of this study is related to the sites from which I collected data.
I collected data from the SEC website, Yahoo finance, and Morningstar. I initially
thought it would be easy to get data, but the SEC website was difficult to search for
companies to examine. This prolonged the data collection process, as I had to go to
different parts of the site to obtain the necessary information. With EM and insider
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trading, it is good that it is exposed as much as possible. With the way this information is
hidden, it will be hard for prospective investors to do any kind of investigation or
research of their own before making the decision to invest in a company that has already
been cited for earnings manipulation because of insider trading.
One other limitation worthy of mention is the use of secondary data. The source
of information utilized for this research study is all archival and secondary data. The
firms that were examined came from the SEC, Yahoo Finance, Morning Star, as well as
the NYSE website. All reports—ranging from financial reports, 10K, 10Q, litigations,
and trading—also came from the SEC website and this information was released over a
12-year period; as such, any mistakes made in reporting may not be recognized. I have
attempted to eliminate overlapping insider trading and EM that were not in the period of
review. However, other factors, such as earnings announcements, may have influenced
the same period.
My study covers an 11-year period of 2002-2012 starting with January 1st of
2002 to December 31st of 2012. I did not examine any periods outside of the timeframe,
so this limited the data findings strictly to that period. Tracing of information that is
related to insider trading patterns and EM as well as earnings announcements opens the
door for generalization of the study to other areas of knowledge acquisition. As I have
shown, insider trading influences EM. It is logical that any other insider trading patterns
would cause a similar reaction that will lead to earnings manipulation. Further study
would reveal the possibilities with this.
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Recommendations
Since it has been established that there is an association between insider trading
patterns and EM citation, I have made the following recommendations to provide a
starting point that will assist firms, investors, regulators, auditors, as well as the general
public in spotting insider trading that will lead to earnings manipulation before it
happens. The first recommendation is that the correct information that assists in
mitigating insider trading should be provided to all interested parties. Because corporate
insiders often receive information first, there is a need for firms to disseminate correct
information to its stakeholders and employees, as well as ensure that the information is
both validated and reliable. If the information is both valid and reliable, there is a
potential for prospective investors to make good decisions if they want to invest in the
firm.
The second recommendation is that financial reporting and reporting format
should be used to identify any new insider trading patterns that are associated with
financial statements. Using both financial reporting and reporting format is no different
than using sales, accounts receivables, and inventory methods to see if these have been
manipulated in any way to increase earnings. The 1998-2007 Treadway Commission
reported that revenue (sales) fraud was used more often as it was discovered that over
60% of the cases that were assessed by SEC were engaged in one form of insider trading.
The use of non-financial measures can be implemented to identify different
patterns of insider trading through corporate governance, which is the third
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recommendation. This recommendation is rooted in the findings of Treadway
Commission report as well as the findings of the current study, wherein it was found that
when insiders control more than 50% of the board, there tends to be higher indicators of
fraud as a result of insider trading and earnings manipulation. Thus, it is pertinent that
these findings be presented to regulators, investors, and auditors so that they will be able
to advise their clients on prior insider trends or any earnings manipulation are present and
the need to ensure strong internal control measures and corporate governance measures
are in place and functional to stop such practices. Rezaee (2005) summarized that
corporations with strong corporate governance and strong internal control rarely
experienced financial statement fraud.
Another recommendation is that colleges and universities should introduce
forensic accounting into the accounting curriculum. The focus should be on areas of
fraudulent financial reporting as well as insider trading and earnings manipulation.
Current cases on insider trading and earnings manipulation should be incorporated into
the classes so that students will be able to see what is happening and trending in the
accounting profession.
Finally, top executives have been found to be the greatest perpetrators in many
insider trading cases that lead to EM citation. Therefore, it is recommended that
investigations occur regarding motives behind these acts by trying to identify key
characteristics of the individuals engaged in insider trading. It would be similarly
beneficial to examine the relationship between the role of the regulators and the auditors
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in the identifying insider trading and EM as well as the types of tools that can assist them
in this process. Implementing these steps, as well as engaging in future research, will be
able to ensure that the regulators, investors, auditors, the general public as well as other
interested parties are prepared to fight against the dire consequences that insider trading
and EM have had on the society.
Implications to Social Change
Loss of trust, audit failures, job losses, indictments, and other failures in the
business world have diminished the trust and confidence that investors, regulators, the
general public, and auditors had for the financial sector. Insider trading and EM have
continued to expand, leading to financial statement fraud that is still prevalent and
continues to derail the financial system as well as the business sector. Interestingly,
insider trading and EM have been mentioned numerously on an individual basis as the
leading cause of fraud in corporations but have not been investigated together as one unit.
This research study intended to change this trend by centering on the research question
that was posed in the study regarding the association between number of EM citations
and patterns of insider trading in publicly trading firms. Findings from this study
demonstrate that there is an association between insider trading patterns and EM citation
controlling for firm size. This is enabled by a number of factors such as how information
is disseminated to the investors, through stock options purchases, incentives based on
performance, compensation structures, lack of corporate governance, top executive spur
of the moment decisions to invest without proper vetting of the portfolio, as well as the
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number of insiders who sit on the board of the firms. Business management professionals
may want to be able to allow for the dissemination of information on a strategic basis
(deHaan et al., 2015).
By understanding the relationship between insider trading patterns and EM
citation, regulators, investors, auditors, the public, and other interested parties have the
chance to identify any insider trading patterns before they happen and be able to discover
ways to reduce insider trading that will lead to earnings manipulation. In doing so, this
may potentially lead to the demise of the corporation, allowing for the development of
various models to incorporate factors such as ratios and corporate governance that will
assist with spotting possible trading and earnings manipulation.
With the lessons learned, recommendations, and suggestions for future studies,
this study will be able to contribute to the accounting and finance literature by
introducing different ways to observe insider trading patterns and EM as a combined
focus. It is the intent of this study that investors, regulators, auditors, the general public
and other interested parties will be able to learn from past issues and mistakes and use the
insight gained from this research study to inspire them to work with other scholars and
academics to bring back the confidence in the financial markets as well as the accounting
profession. Working together will facilitate positive social change by reducing the
economic and social effects, such as loss of jobs and bankruptcies that insider trading and
EM have had on the financial and business sectors and society as a whole.
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Conclusion
Insider trading and EM are not inherently negative when they are used the way in
which they were intended. Because insider trading has not been defined as either good or
bad, many firms have taken advantage of it by circumventing the policies that surround it
in the hopes that they will not be caught. Similar to insider trading, EM has been used in
ways that reflect negatively on firms, where firm members have used it to perpetuate
fraud by using the discretionary measures available to firms or executives making
decisions such as stock buybacks or classification shifting. In a time when the spoken or
written word from the corporation influences how decisions are made by investors,
prospective investors, or the public, it is important to understand how and when to
announce organizational intent based on the type and kind of information that is being
passed out to those that will be affected by such information. Making announcements that
pertain to earnings in the wrong way, giving false information to investors, and
withholding the correct information from all or passing the information to a limited few
could lead or result in organizational failure or lead to bankruptcies. In an atmosphere of
competition for corporate survival, it is essential for corporate management to have all
the pieces of the corporate puzzle in mind when making decisions. The more information
there is available for decision-making purposes, the greater the opportunities for
corporate growth and social development. Additional knowledge leads to greater
decision-making and worldwide success.
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